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A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY WEST GERMAN RELATIONS WITH EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

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A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY WEST GERMAN RELATIONS WITH EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

German interest in the nations of East Central Europe dates back for centuries. However, since the nineteenth century this interest has assumed a hegemonic nature. Economically this area has been of great importance to Germany and culturally, the hundreds of thousands of German nationals that have lived in enclaves throughout the area since the Middle Ages form strong links with Germany.

In World War II the suppression of this area by the Nazis is well-known, and in the post war period the majority of Germans located in present day West Germany has been separated from the East by the Iron Curtain.

The purpose of the thesis is to discover the nature and extent of contemporary West German relations with East Central Europe. This topic is justified by the fact that no study has been made in this area. In view of the historical interest that Germans have had in eastern affairs, it is logical to assume that this interest has not disappeared even in today's divided world.

Some definitions are required for the sake of clarification. The area referred to has been called East Central Europe, a term coined by Professor Oscar Halecki in his book: Borderlands of Western Civilization; A History of East Central Europe.[1] On the first page

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[1]New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Thomas Hobbes, in the writing of that doubtful Leviathan, looked back for analogies. Hobbes, alone the seventeenth century, could imagine the assembled a Leviathan monster. Consequently with the eye of great Leviathans to Leviathan and authoritarian, the monarchs or Leviathans of Hobbes authoritarian that have lived in modern Leviathan. Leviathan the idea Hobbes the Hobbes idea Hobbes with Leviathan.

It would appear that if this appearance of Hobbes idea or the Hobbes is authoritarian, and in the place has lacked the authority of Leviathan lacked in power by that Leviathan has been separated from the Hobbes by the Leviathan Hobbes.

The purpose of the Hobbes is to discover the Hobbes and authority of Leviathan that Hobbes relations with Hobbes Leviathan. This Hobbes is Hobbes by the Leviathan Hobbes the Hobbes Leviathan. In view of the Leviathan Hobbes Leviathan has Hobbes in modern Hobbes, it is Hobbes to Leviathan that Hobbes between the Hobbes disappeared when in Hobbes's Leviathan Hobbes.

These Hobbes are required for the Hobbes of Leviathan. The Hobbes Leviathan to the Hobbes Hobbes Leviathan Hobbes, a Hobbes Hobbes by Hobbes Hobbes Hobbes in the Hobbes Leviathan of Hobbes Leviathan a Hobbes of Hobbes Leviathan Hobbes.[1] In the Hobbes Hobbes

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[1]See Hobbes The Hobbes Hobbes Theory, 1970.

of Chapter I he defines the area as limited to the west by a line extending from Sweden south to Italy and to the east by the Russian and Turkish borders. In this thesis this area has been reduced somewhat to include the lands of Western and Southern Slavs, Rumanians and Magyars or, in other words, the present day satellite nations and Yugoslavia, but excluding East Germany. The omission of East Germany becomes almost a necessity since its contact with West Germany comprises a completely separate issue of free Germany versus communist Germany.

For the sake of brevity and variety West Germans have occasionally been referred to as "Germans". East Germany is rarely mentioned and when it does appear, there is no doubt as to which Germany is intended.

In reference to the organization of the thesis, a general progression from the negative to the positive has been attempted. After a short historical background, setting the stage as it were, a review of the impediments that hinder relations between West Germany and East Central Europe has been undertaken. It is necessary to know just what they are, their importance and their significance in order to understand contemporary West German relations with the east.

Following this a chapter is devoted to West Germany's search for an accomodation with East Central Europe, covering the government's foreign policy, the critique for and against it in West

Germany, the attitude of the satellite governments toward West Germany and the attitudes toward West Germany of East European émigrés as representative of the populations who cannot express themselves freely.

The remainder of the thesis is devoted to a chronological approach to the attempts by West Germany to have dealings with East Central Europe in the fields of politics, economics and human relationships. Of the three chapters in this section the first covers the time period from 1949-1955 when West Germany was under allied occupation, but with an internal government and some authorized activities in international affairs.

The second time period, to which a chapter is devoted, covers the granting of sovereignty in 1955 until the expiration of office of the third Bundestag and cabinet in 1961. During this period foreign affairs were guided by Chancellor Adenauer assisted by Dr. Heinrich von Brentano as Foreign Minister.

The third and final chapter devoted to actual relations covers the time period from the autumn of 1961 to the present, during which Dr. Gerhard Schroeder became Foreign Minister.

The framework has purposely been narrowed to include only West German relations with East Central Europe since 1949 in order to examine the interaction between the two areas. However, in the next to the last chapter this framework has been expanded to include the European setting as there are developments

here that impinge on the subject under discussion.

No published studies of West German-East Central European relationships have so far been introduced in the United States, and based on information available in this country, it appears that none has been published in Europe. West German interest in eastern affairs is very high, but no general survey appears to have been undertaken. Of course, from a historian's point of view such a topic is too close to the present, but from the viewpoint of a political scientist this type of subject offers considerable food for thought and discussion. Thus, it is hoped that the following survey will contribute to filling a gap that has been hitherto neglected.

In conclusion, some remarks are reserved for sources of information. All material was gathered in the United States, although a much more thorough study might have been conducted had the opportunity arisen to carry on research in West Germany. Hence the title of this thesis is phrased as a survey. This is also the reason for such a preponderance of secondary material in the bibliography. The New York Times and the London Times have been utilized quite extensively inasmuch as these newspapers are nearly the only ones with indices. It is believed that considerable valuable newspaper information and comment both here and abroad is wasted for lack of indexing, although there have been some recent minor changes in this direction. Books and periodicals

listed usually cover this subject matter only incidentally as a side issue; the whole research effort has been directed toward synthesizing a mass of informational details into a comprehensive and comprehensible whole.

In addition, considerable valuable information has been gained from interviews with an official of the German Embassy in Washington, D.C., and from interviews with three émigré leaders from East Central Europe. Of course, one might well challenge the accuracy and objectivity of the contributions of the three émigrés, although highly placed in their present émigré organizations or in previous free governments of their respective nations. However, with the present difficulty of ascertaining the outlook of the non-communist populations in East Europe, their remarks are considered to be highly valuable. The questions posed to them included reference to such subjective matters as the attitudes and feelings of the non-communist East Europeans toward present day West Germany. Thus, the interview technique is considered to be a most valid tool of research in a thesis of this type.

CHAPTER II

A HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS OF GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE EAST

The history of German relations with East Central Europe dates back to the migrations at the time of the fall of Rome, when Teutons and Slavs came into contact with one another. Relations between the two groups have generally been inimical. In this chapter only the most important aspects of the relations between Germany and East Central Europe will be touched upon in order to present a background that will provide some perspective for evaluation and analysis of present day relations.

German Traditions in Eastern Policies in the Nineteenth Century

For centuries a cleavage existed between the Germanic people in Central Europe and the Slavs in East Central Europe. Prior to and during the Napoleonic era Poland ceased to exist as an independent state as a result of the partitions of this country in 1772, 1793 and 1795. After the Napoleonic interlude the peace makers at the Congress of Vienna tried to turn the clock back to the *status quo ante bellum* which resulted in the constant suppression of nationalism and liberalism among the peoples of East Central Europe, a situation that was to prevail during the nineteenth century. Generally speaking the Western and Southern Slavs in East Central Europe were under the domination of an Eastern Slav, the Russian czar, and the Germans, the Austrian Emperor and the Prussian King. To these must be added the Sultan who was the fourth autocratic ruler. This situation initiated

one trend in German foreign policy, namely to look beyond East Central Europe and conclude agreements with Russia at the expense of the peoples in between. The results of these would, of course, affect the Western Slavs far more than the Southern ones inasmuch as the latter would be geographically on the periphery. This trend of bridging East Central Europe can be documented up to recent times and it is apparent in the thinking of many Germans in the contemporary period as will be shown later.

The second trend in German foreign policy is that of Germany concluding agreements with neighboring states in the east, directed against Russia in an attempt to stem Russian westward expansile trends. Poland was the most likely partner for this type of agreement. Although the instances developing this trend are fewer, it appears in German thinking today. An early example of this trend occurred in the revolutionary year of 1848 when a new minister of foreign affairs in Prussia, Baron H. von Arnim, favored the idea of a Polish leader, Ludwik Mieroslawski, starting a war against czarist Russia.

Another example of the opposite trend in the nineteenth century occurred in 1863 when Prussia aligned herself with Russia during the Polish insurrection and promised cooperation in the Alvensleben Convention. This understanding with Russia served Germany well in the Franco-German war of 1870-71. A few years later Bismarck achieved additional understanding by concluding the so-called Reinsurance Treaty

with Russia in 1887 which, however, was to last for only three years.

Before leaving the nineteenth century another phenomenon must be examined namely the growth of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism.

Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism

In the revolutionary year of 1848 a Pan-Slavic Congress convened in Prague hoping to create independent governments for Slavic people in the Austrian Hungarian empire. This unifying drive of Slavs was an expression of suppressed nationalism following the Congress of Vienna period. Of course, these tendencies were crushed, but many Slavs in East Central Europe expected that their liberation would come from Russia.

On the German side similar trends can be noted. However, in the last century, Austria remained separated from Germany which after 1871 was united. However, the nationalistic trend of Pan-Germanism in a sense has persisted into the twentieth century when it was exploited by Nazi ideology. It is most important in this study to note that ever since the Middle Ages substantial pockets of Germans existed in nearly all of the countries of East Central Europe, thus giving German nationalism a latent resource again exploited by Hitler. Since World War II these enclaves have all has been eliminated, but their existence has not yet been forgotten.

To return to the Slavic side, the importance of Pan-Slavism has been effectively summed up in the following manner:

> On the whole it can be said that Panslavism was chiefly a sentiment expressing common Slav hostility against Germany; it was not a positive element of unity among the Slavs, and least of all was it an incentive to accepting Russian hegemony.[1]

What is of import to this study is that hostility against Germany is deeprooted and that this hostility generated Slav unity to some extent.

The Interwar Period

The two trends presented above can be discerned in interwar affairs as well. The formation of a bridge over Poland occurred when the two outcasts from polite international society concluded the Rapallo Treaty in 1922 and a neutrality treaty in 1926.

In 1934 Nazi Germany concluded a non-aggression treaty with Poland showing an example of the opposite trend. Five years later the reverse took place when Hitler concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR which was to have a detrimental effect on several nations in between Germany and Russia, inasmuch as East Central Europe was carved up between the two. Of course, it must be realized that these changes must be viewed from the broader framework of interwar European politics when shifting realignments caused the exchange of international partners. It is curious to note that even today German-Soviet cooperation is not entirely non-existent in the USSR, when the latter would like to wean West Germany away from

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[1]Hajo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 94.

NATO. "The ideas ... underlying the Rapallo Treaty are still valid today,"[2] a Soviet newspaper has stated.[3]

In regard to Germans living in East Central Europe, this situation posed many problems. However, the Germans were not the only minority in East Central Europe after the peace settlements following World War I. Minority treaties were intended to protect those nationals who were living outside their homeland. With the advent of Hitler, German minorities were to play a more important role. Nazi race doctrine developed superiority feelings among the Germans to the detriment of those nations having German minorities. The Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia and the Germans in Poland are well-known pawns in Hitler's schemes. Furthermore, other irredentist groups were exploited. One example will suffice, that of Mgr. Tiso's Slovak People's Party; this group under Tiso gained independence for Slovakia under German protection after the fall of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939.

World War II and Its Consequences

In World War II Hitler brought to fruition several of his concepts. One of the better known is that of Lebensraum through which

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[2]N. Polyanov, "Spirit of Rapallo and Modern Times," Izvestia, April 16, 1957, p. 4, as quoted in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. IX, no. 15 (May 22, 1957), p. 34.

[3]These two trends are more fully analyzed by Emanuel Birnbaum in "German Eastern Policy, Yesterday and Tomorrow," International Affairs (London), vol. 31, no. 4 (October, 1955), pp. 427-434.

territorial acquisitions would alleviate population concentrations in Germany particularly at the expense of East Central Europe and Russia. The experiences of the nations in this area testify to the execution of this foreign policy.

Another concept linked with the Lebensraum idea was that of Grossraumwirtschaft through the systematic execution of which captive nations would contribute to the autarkical development of the Third Reich. This economic exploitation further affected East Central Europe detrimentally, some nations more than others.

In reviewing the actions of the Allies during World War II several important decisions affecting East Central Europe were made.

In the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain wished "to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."[4]

Several years later at the Yalta Conference, held from February 4 to 11, 1945, the Big Three issued in their Protocol of the proceedings a "Declaration on Liberated Europe" wherein it was stated that the three Allied governments would assist "the peoples of the former Axis satellite states in Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems."[5] As is well known now

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[4]Walter Consuelo Langsam, Historic Documents of World War II (Princeton, New Jersey: D. van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1958), p. 74.

[5]Ibid., p. 104.

country "solved" the problems of East Central Europe by imposing the rule of communism.

Of all the nations in East Central Europe no one generated so many problems for the Allies as Poland, and in this respect the future location of Polish borders in particular. As early as six weeks after the German invasion of the Soviet Union an agreement was signed between the Polish government in exile in London and the Soviet government wherein the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, described earlier, was repudiated. Although no mention of boundaries was made in this agreement, the London Poles assumed that the USSR by this repudiation recognized pre-war borders.[6] The Polish boundary question plagued all Allied meetings and councils throughout the war. Ultimately, Poland as a whole was shifted westward in that prewar Polish eastern provinces were ceded to the Soviet Union, and Poland was compensated in the west by absorbing prewar German territory east of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers. Certain conditions were attached as revealed in the Potsdam Protocol of 1945.

> ... The Three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.
>
> The Three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse

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[6]Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (third edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 159.

> to the Czechoslovak frontier, ... shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.[7]

This border has become one of the major international issues between East and West. As yet no peace treaty with Germany has been concluded, but the Oder-Neisse border has assumed progressively a more permanent character. At the time of the Potsdam Conference, the Red Army was in situ throughout the whole East Central European area which gave a fait accompli aspect to the proceedings of the conference.

Another issue which caused a major disturbance was the transfer of German minorities out of East Central Europe. The Potsdam Protocol reads as follows on this matter:

> The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that the transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.[8]

The population transfers were generally anything but humane and descriptions by Germans participating in this operation indicate that the treatment of humans had been reduced to animal level.[9] Of course,

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[7]Langsam, op. cit., pp. 125-126.

[8]Ibid., p. 128.

[9]A good collection of expellee reports is contained in Theodor Schieder (ed.), The Expulsion of the German Population from the Territories East of the Oder-Neisse Line (a selection and translation from Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa, Band I, 1 und I, 2, trans. Dr. Vivian Stranders; Bonn: Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims, [n.d.]).

it must be remembered that at this point human values in East Central Europe had regressed to a pre-civilization status as evidenced only too well by Nazi tyranny.

The population transfers actually started before the end of the war because many Germans wanted to avoid remaining in territories that would be occupied by the Red Army. In toto, the number of Germans expelled from East Central Europe exceeds ten million; an exact count is difficult to obtain due to lack of precise figures. Thus, a situation that had existed for hundreds of years had been reversed. Nevertheless, there still exist enclaves of Germans in East Central Europe. The largest group is located in Romania amounting to some 200,000.[10] Others are located in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary precipitating negotiations at a later date. German expellees and refugees had become a major political force in West Germany inasmuch as it constitutes about one-fifth of the population of that nation and also about a fifth of the voting population.

Summary

The history of West German-East Central European relations is epitomized by a series of disharmonious events. Overlapping ethnic situations, dating back centuries, were almost eliminated after World War II, but the events of World War II occurred within the life span of this generation. Consequently, the memory of these

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[10]Joseph B. Schechtman, "Postwar Population Transfers in Europe. A Survey," The Review of Politics, vol. 15, no. 2 (April 1953), p. 176.

events and of the arrogance of a self-created Herrenvolk linger on. Boundary issues created further problems which still exist today. The Oder-Neisse frontier is a major issue although it must be kept in mind that frontier issues exist among the satellites and also between them and the Soviet Union although the rule of communism has had somewhat of an anesthetic effect on these border issues and other issues as well, inside the communist bloc.

This history of negative international relations between West Germany and East Central Europe must be kept in mind when analyzing present day relations. As will be seen in the next chapter there are circumstances and situations which tend to exert a mutually repellent effect upon West Germany and the satellite nations in the postwar world as well.

CHAPTER III

OBSTACLES TO WEST GERMAN - EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN RELATIONS

Nations geographically adjacent to one another cannot but have some type of mutual relationships. Examples of complete isolation by a state are not too common in modern times, and attempts to achieve this have generally not been successful. There always appears to be some degree of interdependence in the community of nations. The extent to which good neighbor relations are developed depends upon many factors. In the case of West Germany and East Central Europe the elaboration of mutually satisfactory relations is subject to a number of obstacles many of which are not ordinarily present in the interstate relations of other nations. In the case of West Germany these impediments have resulted from World War II or the Cold War. Since they form the framework, as it were, for contemporary relations, they should be given close scrutiny; this chapter will attempt to examine these factors.

Theoretical Divergences between West Germany and East Central Europe

A number of conflict provoking issues are prevalent in the two areas. Upon consideration of territorial foundations, West Germany as a sovereign has been deprived of considerable territory which she maintains to be hers. This results from the fact that the Soviet zone and the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line lie beyond her jurisdiction. Any geographical aspirations

the East Central European peoples may have in relation to Germany are rather well checked by communist hegemonic rule; however, territorially speaking those nations neighboring Germany would more likely wish to retain what they now possess. Thus, there is a conflict of revisionism versus status quo. In the area of nationalism, feelings against each other still run high especially in the nations close to Germany in view of the historical experiences each side has had. Furthermore, there are racial, religious, social and cultural differences between the Germans and the Slavs.

One of the major issues which has generated conflict is the ideological one. Communist rule is stopped by a demarkation line that runs through the center of Europe in the form of the iron curtain which tends to increase international pressure on each side. West Germany borders on this demarkation line as does Czechoslovakia while Poland is geographically adjacent, but with East Germany as a buffer. Moreover, the nations on the east side of the iron curtain are subject to Soviet domination. Thus, if relations between West Germany and East Central Europe resulting from the latest world conflagration are to be repaired, each side has to operate with more strikes against it from the onset.

Major Impediments Created by the Cold War

A number of situations have arisen as a result of World War II and the Cold War as was observed earlier. One of the major issues is the reunification issue in West Germany.

The Reunification issue. Whether the reunification of Germany will be effected depends not so much upon German efforts as it does upon U.S. - Soviet agreement in addition to the primary consideration whether such a reunification would be in the national interest of both great powers. Should this occur many East Europeans may fear a resurgent German Reich although they no doubt agree that the present division is unnatural. However, in the case of Poland and, to a lesser degree, Czechoslovakia the question there arises concerning how far to the east the Germans would reunify. The Potsdam Protocol gave the pre-World War II territories east of the Oder-Neisse rivers to Poland for her to administer until a peace settlement could be concluded. The Sudetenlands are not covered in such an international agreement, and the concern over future German acquisition of the Sudetenland is less alarming. In West Germany the leaders of the nation realize to a large degree the unreality of effecting reunification, and this issue is usually dormant except at election time when politicians attempt to gain the refugee and expellee vote and thus, allow themselves to proclaim campaign promises that, of course, cannot always be fulfilled. These groups of people appear in both the major political parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, and this affects the campaign platform on both sides.

The Oder-Neisse frontier. Closely allied to the reunification problem, the Oder-Neisse frontier constitutes a second issue

The Constitution issue. Whether the reconsideration of Con-
tract will be attempted directly, or be made even through efforts as
it does upon U.S. - World Commerce in addition to the primary
consideration whether such a reconsideration would be in the national
interest at this great juncture. Should this issue only that have-
been may that a reasonable Senate that, although they in doubt
agree that the present situation is unsatisfactory. However, in the view
of Italian and, in a lesser degree, Continentals the question times
actual consequences has yet to be seen the Congress would consider.
The Italian Ministerial gave the impression of a temporarily
of the Non-Italian Powers to follow the lead to adjustment until
a peace settlement could be concluded. The Nationalists and not
showed in such as International Agreement, and the Russian Gov-
Future Russian negotiations of the Conference in Paris elsewhere. In
that Germany the Leaders of the Nation realize in a large degree
the necessity of adjusting conditions, and this issue is usually
treated except at elections the most conditions allowed to pass
the policies and negotiations with the Nation, allow Germany to provide
Germany provides that, of course, Russia claims be satisfied. These
groups of people appear to have the right political leaders, the
Catholics Democrats and the Social Democrats, and this affirms the
campaign platform as well.

The Non-Italian Problem. Usually Italy in the reconsidera-
tion problem, the Non-Italian Powers consider Italy's moral issue

that is of major importance in reference to the development of mutually satisfactory relations between West Germany and Poland. The background of this issue has been presented. The East German state, not recognized in the west, has concluded an agreement with Poland stating that these rivers will constitute the border. This was done on November 28, 1950, at Görlitz. In West Germany Chancellor Adenauer has repeatedly stated since 1953 that "the problems connected with the Oder-Neisse line are not to be solved by force, but exclusively by peaceful means."[1]

The statements contained in the Potsdam Protocol regarding the future disposition of the ex-German territories east of these rivers represent the official position of the NATO governments although this border has gradually assumed an aura of permanence. Furthermore, the Germans argue that it is unlawful to detach territory from a state from the viewpoint of international morality [sic.]; that international law outlaws annexations; populations have the right of self-determination; and that mass expulsion is illegal.[2]

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[1]Walter Hubatsch, Die deutsche Frage (Würzburg: A.G. Ploetz, 1961), p. 172; and Goettingen Research Committee, German Eastern Territories, trans. Helen Taubert and Anni Dickenheim (Würzburg: Holzner, 1957), p. 141.

[2]Zoltan Michael Szaz, Germany's Eastern Frontiers, the Problem of the Oder-Neisse Line (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1960), p. 177 et. seq.

The West Germans also complain that the Poles want West Germany to recognize a border that is not one of West Germany's.[3] This argument appears weak when one considers that the preamble to the German constitution - the Basic Law - states, inter alia, that the German people in the Länder in West Germany, when enacting this basic law, "also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied,"[4] i.e., the Soviet zone and refugees and expelles from the East. Moreover, the West German nation feels that it speaks for the Soviet zone as well.

The Polish government has argued most fervently for the finality of this border. Referring to the earlier mentioned Potsdam Protocol the words "former" and "administration" were stressed to imply a cession of territory and, consequently, a peace treaty conference would merely be a formality.[5] The communist régimes of East Germany and the USSR, both under Stalin and Khrushchev, have rigidly expounded this view and the permanence of this border remains indisputable among communist governments. In spite of the

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[3]Mr. Joerg Kastl, First Secretary, German Embassy, Washington, D.C. in an interview at the Embassy on March 11, 1963, hereinafter cited as the Kastl Interview of March 11, 1963.

[4]Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Foreign Office, Germany's Position under International Law, No 14 936 11.61 (Bonn: n.n., 1961), p. 10.

[5]Bolesław Wiewióra, Polish-German Frontier From the Standpoint of International Law (second revised edition; Poznań: Wydawnictwo Zachodnie, 1959), pp. 82-93, passim.

slight independence gained from the 1956 uprisings the new Polish leader Gomułka also has taken the same position. In a speech given at Poznan in 1957, he said that only "the Soviet Union can guarantee the Oder-Neisse frontier."[6] Professor Zbigniew K. Brzezinski considers the border problem to be one of four salient factors restraining Poland from straying too far from the communist fold. The other three factors are geographic isolation, bloc economic integration and the Warsaw Pact.[7]

The growth of West Germany, her entry into NATO and the presence of western troops therein coupled with the overall rehabilitation of Europe in general and West Germany in particular have contributed to Polish uneasiness over the border issue. The Polish government is, of course, well aware of the western position concerning the ultimate establishment of the border via an all-German peace treaty. Thus, whenever the question arises officially or unofficially in the west, the Polish government usually reacts by raising queries, objections and demands for clarification.

Although the provinces between the Oder-Neisse rivers and the 1937 German border in the east comprised one of the most devastated zones in World War II, Poland has been slow to rehabilitate

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[6]Deadline Data on World Affairs (Deadline Data Inc., New York), Poland, p. 41, June 5, 1957.

[7]Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (revised edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 38.

and develop them doubtlessly because of their uncertain status. In the last few years this area has been progressively rehabilitated through acceleration of reconstruction. More than one third of the present population of this territory were born there since World War II, and Poland is gradually assuming a more permanent feeling toward it.

Another facet of the Oder-Neisse frontier problem must be mentioned, namely religious issues involving the Vatican. The Catholic primate of Poland, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, is a prominent advocate for the polonization of the disputed border territories, no doubt the only goal he shares with the Polish government. Prior to World War II a concordat between the Vatican and the German Reich stipulated that the appointment of Roman Catholic bishops in Germany was subject to the approval of the German government. In 1953 the Polish government issued a similar decree requiring Polish governmental approval of Roman Catholic clergy in Poland, including the old German territories now under Polish administration. West Germany still claims approval rights for all German territory, thus creating a conflict over the disputed Oder-Neisse provinces.

Among the German population at large there is a tendency to regard the Oder-Neisse line as a more and more permanent arrangement, and it is realized that as time progresses the Poles become more and more likely to stay in the disputed territories. The refugee organizations and their importance as a voting bloc exerts

a potent influence upon foreign policy formulations using them to tailor German foreign policy to the goal of someday, somehow, regaining the territories lost to the east of the Oder-Neisse line although, as stated earlier, the federal government has renounced force as a means of achieving this end. With growing affluence and well being in Western Europe, the West German population becomes self satisfied and problems such as the Oder-Neisse line decrease in interest. As an ex-German diplomat has said:

> Today already one dares to speak about the Oder-Neisse territories, yes, even about reunification with just a resigned shoulder-shrug.[8]

A somewhat moral view was expressed in a memorandum issued by the Protestant Press Service in West Germany. This memorandum was drafted by a group of eight prominent protestant leaders advocating the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse frontier and urging amelioration of relations with the communist neighboring nations.[9] This view perhaps underscores atonement for past wrongs more than anything else, and is claimed not to present German public opinion[10] by some, while others think that it made a strong impression.[11]

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[8]Albrecht von Kessel, "Perspektiven einer Deutschen Aussenpolitik," Bestandsaufnahme; eine Deutsche Bilanz, 1962, Hans Werner Richter, editor (München: Verlag Kurt Desch, 1962), p. 60. Translation of this and subsequent quotations from German sources have been made by the author.

[9]The New York Times, March 25, 1962, p. 35.

[10]Kastl Interview of March 11, 1963.

[11]J.A. Allemann, "Adenauer's Eastern Policy," Survey, no. 44-45 (October, 1962), p. 35.

It must also be realized that the younger generation of West Germans are more likely to view the present border situation with Poland with more equanimity than their elders.[12] Additionally, the West German economic boom has absorbed available labor in West Germany and in the present prosperity many refugees and expellees are much better off now materially than they were earlier.

German legal aspects. The removal of German nationals from East Central Europe has impinged on legal doctrines. Since these are not subject to law enforcement they become issues for debate and argument, especially since they support West German outlooks.

Population transfers did not originate during or after World War II. At the time of the treaty of Lausanne, in 1923, an agreement was concluded providing for the exchange of Turkish and Greek minorities. Although the removal of many Germans after World War II has been considered as an example of this type of enterprise, the difference is that this latter operation was a one-way operation.

In this connection the doctrine of Heimatsrecht or "the Right to Homeland" or to "Residence" enters in. This doctrine is considered by Germans as one of the human rights. It is entirely beyond the scope of this survey to define human rights, indicate their applicability or discuss their implementation. However, the

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12"Home Truths and Heimatsrecht," the Economist, vol. 203, no. 6198 (June 9, 1962), pp. 1007-1009, passim.

Heimatsrecht Doctrine has been developed by the Germans and they claim that it can be traced to the Hague Convention on War on Land (1907), the Atlantic Charter (1941), the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations (1946), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Geneva Agreements (1944).[13] As just mentioned this is a German conceived human right tailored to fit the desire for return that expelles are bound to feel. After having been uprooted from locales in East Central Europe where Germans had been living for centuries this aspiration is understandable. Furthermore, they had often achieved a rather comfortable living standard in comparison to their Slav or Magyar neighbors in certain areas of East Central Europe. It must also be borne in mind that the word Heimat carries with it not only the connotation of "home", but also a non-translatable concept of the environment or region surrounding one's homestead.

German refugees and expelles not only believe in Heimatsrecht as a doctrine or theory, but also in hereditary Heimatsrecht. Thus, the demand for return could theoretically multiply as the population grows.

Another legal doctrine created by the West Germans is the so called Hallstein-Doctrine. It can be regarded as a safeguard or an impediment depending upon the viewpoint taken.

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[13] G.C. Paikert, The German Exodus (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 50, footnote 3.

Nevertheless, many would agree that it represents a hindrance. Professor Hallstein, a former West German Secretary of State, now Chairman of the Commission of the European Economic Community lends his name to the thesis which postulates that the federal government of West Germany will not establish diplomatic relations with a government that entertains formal diplomatic relations with the East German régime. This is also applicable in a situation where West Germany has diplomatic ties with a state that decides to recognize East Germany, in which case West Germany will sever relations.[14] This occurred in 1957 when Tito recognized East Germany, and West Germany severed diplomatic relations. One exception to this doctrine now exists inasmuch as West Germany and the Soviet Union have diplomatic relations with each other. It is argued in West Germany that the USSR, as a victor and one of the great powers of World War II "shares competence for German problems."[15]

The reasons for this doctrine have been expounded in the following manner. If the West German government had not created this doctrine the existence of the East German régime or the "DDR",

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[14]Wilhelm G. Grewe, Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH., 1960), p. 414. The author of this book recently was West Germany's Ambassador to the United States and speaks authoritatively on German foreign policy due to his close relations with its formulators in West Germany.

[15]Ernst Friedländer, "The Road to Warsaw," Western World, vol. 2, no. 12 (December, 1959), p. 39.

as abbreviated in German, would be strengthened. This in turn, could lead to the recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier and a valuable bargaining point in a future peace conference would be forfeited. Furthermore, if the Hallstein Doctrine were non-existent and West Germany were to establish diplomatic relations with the satellite governments, this might possibly encourage other nations in the free world to do likewise. Consequently, a proliferation of East German embassies would appear in the capitols of the world. Conceivably, the question of admission of two Germanies to the United Nations could occur since one could not disregard one in favor of the other. A third consequence of not using the Hallstein Doctrine would be that any opposition in East Germany or in the satellite nations for that matter would be demoralized. Finally, if the restraints of the Hallstein Doctrine were non-existent the DDR would gain international status, and the concept of non-interference in a nation's internal affairs in accordance with international law would ensue.[16]

This doctrine has been subject to a great deal of criticism in West Germany. It has been argued that this doctrine has "imposed a political self-blocade with legal weapons."[17] Many West

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[16]Grewe, op. cit., pp. 150-152, passim.

[17]Friedländer, loc. cit.

Germans argue that its government should remember that even bloc countries, although with Soviet support, can elect to establish diplomatic relations with other nations of their choosing, and any tendencies in this direction should not be discouraged. Furthermore, the Hallstein Doctrine dating back to December of 1955 should be re-evaluated since it now, i.e. eight years later, may be advantageous to establish formal relations with nations to the east. As an analogy they point to the situation of the United States and Red China where the former does not recognize the latter. However, the United States does not sever relations with those nations that do so. To some extent these arguments seem to be delineated by party lines and the government opposition favors its rescission. Nevertheless, any foreseeable change in this doctrine is not likely to occur.[18]

Proposals for denuclearized and/or demilitarized zones in Central Europe. In an effort to attempt to break down the rigid barriers between east and west in Central Europe a number of plans have been proposed. The best known of these is the Rapacki Plan named after the foreign minister of Poland. This plan, first submitted to the General Assembly in the fall of 1957, envisioned a denuclearized zone in western Europe, encompassing East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. This plan combined Polish and Soviet interests, and it has been pointed out that the Poles in particular would benefit from it because it would undermine the

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[18]Kastl, Interview of March 11, 1963.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

hold of Soviet troops in Poland and, at the same time, weaken Germany because of an imposed weapons ban coupled with foreign inspection.[19] However, this argument is quite debatable. The German reaction was indicated officially by Chancellor Adenauer who by and large expressed public opinion when he stated that "this would mean the end of NATO and we want to hold on to NATO."[20] Additionally, it was argued in Germany that the execution of this plan would only solidify the boundary between East and West Germany as these two entities would be the main custodians of the atom-free zone.[21] However, many Social Democrats, trade union officials and the Evangelical Church supported the plan.[22]

A similar plan was proffered in 1959 by the West German Social Democrats calling for a nuclear-free "non-tension zone" in Central Europe. Geographically, this zone would encompass the same nations as the Rapacki Plan. In this plan both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would withdraw their forces from this area while the

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[19]Huey Louis Kostanick, "Poland: Geography for Disaster," Current History, vol. 36, no. 212 (April, 1959), p. 209.

[20]Heinrich von Siegler (ed.), Dokumentation zur Deutschlandsfrage, Hauptband II (second complete and enlarged edition; Bonn: Siegler and Co. KG., 1961), p. 316.

[21]Wilhelm Wolfgang Schütz, "New Initiatives for a New Age; A German View," Foreign Affairs, vol. 36, no. 3 (April, 1958), p. 467.

[22]Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 205.

United States and the USSR were to guarantee its existence.[23] However, this plan also ran against political reality and it has become a mere debating issue.

Latent Hostile Feelings from World War II

A psychological obstacle to the amelioration of relations between West Germany and East Central Europe has resulted from the treatment of the local populations by the Nazi occupation forces. Memories of their brutalities persist and the communist régimes capitalize on these memories as a warning to their populations of a rearmed NATO-allied West Germany which supposedly is a threatening neighbor. However, it must be kept in mind that this feeling is not equally as prevalent throughout East Central Europe. The nations closest to Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, suffered the most as is well known while Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria were Nazi allies and fared better. However, resistance groups appeared in the East Central European nations conquered by Nazi Germany. Continuing through the fifties trials of World War II Nazi war criminals have taken place notably in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Consequently, the two nations that ideally should be the first to share plans with West Germany for interstate relations because of geographical proximity, are the two which have cause to express the most grievances against it.

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[23] Hubatsch, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

Summary

In addition to basic differences between Germanic and Slavic peoples, West Germany and the nations of East Central Europe are subject to further impediments to satisfactory relations between the two. These obstacles are both static and changing. The feeling of hostility generated by the Nazi war machine should diminish as a new generation replaces the older one that experienced it, although much of the communist propaganda tries to keep it alive. The problem of the Oder-Neisse frontier diminishes in acerbity in West Germany also through the passage of time, the prosperity of the nation and the waning interest of a younger generation of both West Germans and German expelles. In time, perhaps a similar trend might affect the Heimatsrecht Doctrine. The reunification issue has become more and more a mere debating point since the two Germanies are progressively assuming a more permanent character; the side issue of just how far east reunification ought to progress becomes equally debatable. Thus, in general, except in regard to the Hallstein Doctrine, which so far has remained static, a status of tacit acquiescence seems to prevail.

CHAPTER IV

WEST GERMANY'S SEARCH FOR AN ACCOMMODATION WITH EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

In spite of the impediments discussed and described in the previous chapter the West German government does formulate and publicize foreign policy toward the East. This chapter will define this policy and, additionally, attempt to ascertain various views on the position of West Germany vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. The varied outlooks to be covered include those of West German officialdom, of diverse private opinions in West Germany, of satellite governments and, finally, of émigrés from East Central Europe, insofar as this is possible to ascertain.

West German Foreign Policy

In 1949 the German Basic Law was adopted as a constitution and a federal German government began to function under the three western High Commissioners. Through the ratification of the Paris Accords of 1954 and accession to NATO in 1955 West Germany assumed full sovereign status. Any foreign relations existing during this period will be more closely discussed in the next chapter. However, West Germany's foreign policy was formulated all during the Fifties.

The chief policy formulation group in the West German government is made up of the chancellor and his cabinet. The Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, is the leading personality and exercises a

rather dominant position. He has been described as a very strong willed man who wants "men who are willing to execute his instructions unreservedly."[1] One cabinet minister, the Federal Minister for Bundesrat Affairs, Dr. von Merkatz, discovered this when he criticized Adenauer's policy of failing to establish diplomatic relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Adenauer commented by saying that "cabinet ministers have no right to dance out of line."[2] Adenauer's foreign minister 1955-1961, Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, including some of his staff was also on occasion reprimanded for entertaining independent ideas. Adenauer has stated that he was "particularly displeased with a section of the Ministry which strongly favors closer relationships with Poland and Czechoslovakia."[3]

To a great extent German foreign policy has been directed toward the west. However, West Germany and the Soviet Union have established diplomatic relations with each other, the Hallstein Doctrine notwithstanding, as explained in the previous chapter. These relations were developed shortly after West Germany became a fully sovereign nation in 1955 soon after the Geneva summit conference, but before the October meeting that ended in failure when

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[1]Gerald Freund, Germany Between East and West (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1961), p. 13.

[2]The Times (London), June 8, 1956, p. 10. The eighth or final edition cited throughout, unless otherwise indicated.

[3]Freund, loc. cit.

the foreign ministers of the Big Four attempted to settle all the knotty issues referred to them by the earlier summit meeting. As will be discussed in more detail later, West Germany has had diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.

Adenauer's second and present foreign minister, Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, took office in the fall of 1961. Foreign policy statements do not differ markedly between the two as can be expected according to the earlier description of Chancellor Adenauer. Dr. Wilhelm Grewe, one of von Brentano's assistants, has expressed the general goals of German foreign policy as follows:

> 1. Regaining state sovereignty and freedom of action in foreign affairs.
>
> 2. Security for this sovereignty of action in foreign affairs both against the danger of invasion (such as in Korea, 1950) and against the danger of a communist coup d'état directed from outside (such as the Prague coup, 1948); especially security of Berlin against each attempt to conquer it politically.
>
> 3. The restoration of Germany's state unity, especially the reunification of Western and Central i.e. the Soviet zone of Germany; the restitution of Berlin in its historical role as the capital of Germany; and the territorial consolidation of the German state territory through a freely negotiated peace treaty on the principle of a friendly understanding with neighboring peoples over the knotty border questions.
>
> 4. The strengthening of free Europe through economic integration and political cooperation, and cohesion into the closest knit federated community possible.[4]

The exigencies of the cold war have prevented West Germany from achieving its goals in its three above. Regarding the last

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[4]Grewe, op. cit., p. 13.

item West Germany, with one exception, is a member of all the economic and military international organizations in which western European nations participate. For example, West Germany is a member of NATO and the Communities of the Six while she would not, of course, be a member of the rival organization of the Common Market, namely the European Free Trade Association.

After having examined the general goals of West German foreign policy, it is necessary to determine which goals West Germany has set for herself in the case of eastern Europe. Of interest is Ambassador Grewe's analysis and foreign policy goals in this respect. He observes that West Germany has three problems in the east. The first is West Germany's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The twenty odd Soviet divisions in East Germany and the status of Berlin serve to make this a problem of paramount importance. The second problem involves the question of just what type of relations to have with Poland and Czechoslovakia, the closest neighbors to the east. With Poland there is the earlier discussed "knotty border questions" while with Czechoslovakia West Germany does not have any official border issues although the Sudeten German expellees would think otherwise. The third problem deals with the other nations in East Central Europe: Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary; Albania is considered too distant. West Germany agrees that there are no outstanding political questions with these nations, but there are a number of financial problems that need to be resolved such as demands for settlement of occupation damages, etc. However, it has been pointed out that as far as trade is

concerned, West Germany has centered her present relations with East Central Europe around this field of endeavor, a thesis that will be evident in later chapters.[5]

Based on these problems the goals of West Germany's eastern policy are considered to be as follows:

1. First and foremost, it must be reckoned that the freedom and security of the Federal Republic and West Berlin has to be guarded from communist aggression and other forms of extension of communist hegemony (subversion, infiltration, etc.)

2. We cannot abandon seventeen million Germans in central Germany i.e. the Soviet zone and we cannot resign ourselves to a lasting division of Germany.

3. We must foster friendly relations with our eastern neighbors and regulate our disputes through negotiation and compromise.

4. We must live with the Soviet Union.[6]

To some extent these goals have been partially achieved although complete fulfillment would necessitate a major political rearrangement involving the great powers. Of interest is the belief of the German government that diplomatic relations are not necessarily the only means for inter-nation intercourse. It realizes, however, that no diplomatic relations with East Central European governments are a drawback, but it considers the Hallstein Doctrine overriding. Thus, in place of diplomatic relations, consular

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[5]Ibid., pp. 410-414, passim.

[6]Ibid., pp. 414-415.

Accordingly, each Governor has authority over certain legislative matters. Each Governor receives revenue taxes, fees, or endowments, a budget that will be written in Lunar currency.[1]

Based on these considerations the goals of Moon Government seem to solidify into constituents for the six citizens:

1. First and foremost, it must be evident that the freedom and security of the Federal Government must be kept in by providing their constituent jurisdictions with other forms of protection of essential personal (economic, political, etc.)

2. In normal circumstances citizens should be secure in personal life, the society must not be seen as a threat, rather supporting in a lasting division of labor.

3. In real Federal relationship relations with the previous religious and ethnic are disposing through specialization and cooperation.

4. We must live well in Lunar Union.[2]

If your nations then could have been successfully achieving the things mentioned Federal would demonstrate a major political rearrangement involving the great powers. It indicated in the initial of the Lunar government that Federal relations the two superpowers only same the communication interpretations. It possible, however, that no diplomatic relations was had Federal Government arrangements are a dilemma, and it considers the religious Tension overlaid. Thus, in place of diplomatic relations, western

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[1] Gold, pp. Lunar, Gaeta.

[2] Gold, pp. Lunar.

missions, trade missions, and multipurpose negotiating teams can be utilized.[7]

Dr. Gerhard Schroeder became foreign minister in November 1961. Broad foreign policy goals have not changed appreciably. He advocates economic as well as political integration with the West. He calls for the continued support of NATO and the reunification of Germany without the use of force, as does his superior, Chancellor Adenauer. But the new foreign minister seems to have a somewhat different outlook towards eastern Europe and appears to have assumed more interest in that area. In the fall of 1961 he organized a new planning staff for the purpose of evaluating West Germany's foreign policy towards eastern Europe and reformulation thereof as deemed necessary. To achieve an insight into Dr. Schroeder's views of eastern Europe the following statements will be illuminating:

> Day after day, the propaganda machines of these countries [i.e. the communist countries of Europe] depict to the people the nightmare of revenge-seeking Germans. The face is, however, that we do not follow a policy of revenge or restoration today, nor shall we do so in the future. Our policy does not look back into the past but forwards to tomorrow.
>
> Our participation in building up a new Western Europe has already proved that we are looking beyond pre-war Europe. Political, economic and technical development has made further progress and it is from this that we must proceed. The period of national power politics that characterized pre-war Europe definitely belongs to the past. We aim at a new Europe of free nations living together as good neighbours. The nations of the Warsaw Treaty, too, belong to Europe. In my opinion, it would be a good idea to drop the communist propaganda of hatred and resentment that impairs relations between East European countries and Germany. This could certainly be achieved if the governments of the East bloc did not evade their duty. A start could be made, for example, by establishing better contacts in the fields of cultural life and

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[7] Ibid., p. 154.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

human relations between Germans in the Federal Republic and the peoples of East European countries.

We take a serious interest in the present intellectual disputation that is waging in the East bloc and are convinced that all open-minded undogmatic people in Eastern Europe would profit from an acquaintance with the cultural and political development of Free Europe.[8]

Four months later he said on the same subject:

As regards the East European States, we neither pursue, nor will we pursue, a policy of revenge. We do not hate these people, but have one single aim, and that is to live with them in peace as good neighbors. This is certainly possible. Our policy is directed forwards not backwards. By our cooperation in creating the new order of Europe we have already shown that we look beyond pre-war Europe.[9]

Dr. Schroeder, a lawyer and Minister of the Interior since 1955, may be initiating a new trend in West German foreign policy, Chancellor Adenauer notwithstanding. Perhaps the aging chancellor does not exert the same amount of influence as he did when West Germany was newly born. A British reporter noticed that after a visit by U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to Bonn, Dr. Schroeder expounded rather freely on foreign policy which represented a new departure since Chancellor Adenauer normally would do this himself.[10]

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[8] Germany, Europe and The Free World, a speech made in Dortmund on June 4, 1962 (Bonn: Buch- und Zeitungsdruckerei H. Köllen, 1962), p. 15. An official translation.

[9] Peace, Freedom, Order, a speech at the 10th Federal Conference of the CDU/CSU Protestant Working Group at Wiesbaden on 5 October, 1962 (Bonn: Buch- und Zeitungsdruckerie H. Köllen, 1962), p. 16. An official translation.

[10] Terence Prittie, "Adenauer and Schroeder," The New Republic, vol. 147, no. 2 (July 9, 1962), p. 9.

human relations between Germany in the Federal Republic and the people of East Germany possible.

We have a serious interest in the present international discussion that is going on in the East bloc and are convinced that all unnecessary restrictions should be lifted which prevent the free exchange of ideas, especially the contacts and personal meetings of free citizens.

How radio Liberty is said to be made acceptable

In regard to the East European States, we should propose, but still we propose, a policy of reserve. We do not want to provoke, but have our ideas say, and that is to live with the people as good neighbors. This is essential policy. Our policy is directed towards the individuals. In the understanding the people are under of force as does according some that we have behind various theory.[9]

Dr. Schwarz, a lawyer and attorney of the Bavarian state land, may be initially a man close to that German foreign policy, Chancellor Adenauer confidantes. Prior to this office Schwarz also had served the same person as Lieutenant in the Air Force during was early days. A Bavarian economic-minded that after a visit to U.S. secretary of State, John Dulles, in 1955, Dr. Schwarz accepted radio Freedom as foreign policy which recommended a new department since Chancellor Adenauer personally would do this also.[10]

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[9] Gerhard Schwarz and the Free Europe, a speech, cited in proceedings on Radio Liberty Committee Hearings and Subcommittee, 1, Hearings, 1960), p. 12. or official translation.

[Radio Liberty, Series, a speech by Dr. Gerhard Schwarz, Federal Minister of the Bavarian Government, 1956 (Radio Liberty and Subcommittee to Hearings, 1960), p. 12. or official translation.

[10] Gerhard Schwarz, "Adenauer and Germany," The Year Europe, vol. 1957, no. 2 (Oct 1, 1957), p. 7.

Within the larger framework of international relations between east and west one can embark upon a conjectural discussion as to whether or not Schroeder's statements reflect a changing world situation. Setting aside such a discussion, however, it is readily discernable that certain events or evolutions on the world arena are well observed by him. For example, he hopes that the ideological rift within the communist bloc which has divided monolithism into polycentrism will offer more opportunity for closer contacts between West Germany and the satellite countries, a factor which could lead to improved inter-nation relationships and help to eradicate the memories of World War II. This schism in the bloc could also have been the basis for some reorientation toward the east. On the other hand the responsiveness of East European governments is manipulated by the Kremlin despite comparative Polish autonomy since 1956. Nevertheless, the eastern block with its economic problems cannot have failed to note the prosperity and material wellbeing in western Europe, an area in which West Germany, the main enemy of World War II, is a key member. This evolution of European affairs should diminish the acerbity between the two areas as time progresses.

West German foreign policy towards Eastern Europe - called Ostpolitik in Germany - has been considered by some to be a Nichtostpolitik. What criticism and comment there has been both inside and outside of West Germany is of interest, and this survey now turns to this aspect.

Unofficial Views and Public Opinion

Regarding unofficial discussion of West Germany's role in Central and Eastern Europe three distinct spheres can be delineated. First, public opinion and the views of various groups in West Germany should be explored; secondly, the arguments raised by satellite governments; and thirdly, the views expressed by émigrés from East Central Europe, representing the population in that area that cannot speak freely.

West German views. Before examining various groups in West Germany it is appropriate to ascertain public interest in foreign affairs. A West German "Institute for Market and Opinion Research" (abbreviated as EMNID in German) over a number of years has conducted surveys among West Germans. The results from the question, "What do you personally consider most important: that we Germans are on good terms with the Americans, on good terms with the Russians, or that we stay neutral between the two?" have been as follows:

Year	% Good terms with U. S.	% Good terms with USSR	% Neutral	% No Opinion
1951	39	1	48	12
1952	41	1	44	14
1953	46	1	42	11
1954	48	2	48	2
1955	48	3	45	4

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Year	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1952	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1953	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1954	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1955	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1956	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Table (cont.)

Year	% Good terms with U.S.	% Good terms with USSR	% Neutral	% No Opinion
6/56	38	4	54	4
11/56	31	2	62	5
1957	39	2	55	4
10/57	42	3	52	3
5/58	36	3	58	3
9/58	36	2	60	2
8/59	41	2	54	3

[11]

It is a well known fact that fallacies are inherent in public opinion polls which limits the interpretation of the above information to some extent. However, of those polled a considerable percentage, averaging around fifty percent, prefers disassociation from east and west. Without doubt a large number of the neutral group consists of individuals that are either non-political or a-political as far as politics are concerned, especially in Germany where obedience to leadership has been a salient national trait. As further evidence in this area, the RAND Corporation has conducted an exhaustive study from which the following conclusions have been derived:

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[11] RAND Informationen, Bielefeld West Germany, trans. E.W. Bennitzer, West European Opinion on Defense, No. 41, German Polls of 1959 on Rearmament, Atomic Energy, Nuclear Weapons and Balance of World Power, and Prospects of Peace, P-123 (Santa Monica, California: the Rand Corporation, 1700 Main Street, January 22, 1960), pp. 11-12.

1. In the political realm Germans are likely to mention reunification as Germany's major political problem;

2. Popular interest in political life is still not overwhelming, but appears to be rising; and

3. There is a fairly strong trend toward a two party system.[12]

Consequently, the attitudes of West Germany towards East Central Europe cannot be found among the public at large to any great extent. Thus, to determine these attitudes it will be necessary to look at the opinions of various "élite" interest groups, to use a concept promulgated by a number of writers.[13] However, even here authors on this subject as often as not seem to have disagreements. Setting aside political party designations, individuals with reactionary or conservative feelings include refugees, industrialists looking for markets in eastern Europe, rightwingers, and those who advocate strong German nationalism and would look to an individual such as Franz Josef Strauss as a leader. Often they blame all the victors of World War II for Germany's current status and on occasion evidence anti-American feelings. Their slogan can be summed up in a quote by a former

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[12] Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, West German Leadership and Foreign Policy (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957), p. 304.

[13] For example, Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People (second edition; Englewood, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 31 et seq., or Hugh Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace (revised edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1962), p. 164 et seq.

West German ambassador:

> What God, geography, and we Germans have created cannot be rent asunder by fumbling politicians.[14]

Since they argue that the USSR is the key factor in effecting German reunification this is the nation to do business with and, additionally, dealings with the satellites might serve only to antagonize the USSR; this, in turn, could be detrimental in furthering Germany's national interests. They also argue that West Germany should possess nuclear weapons and become a strong deterrent force, thereby increasing their international prestige. While Adenauer and, no doubt, his successor, Erhard, would oppose this view, the ex-defense minister, Franz Josef Strauss, would not, they reason. Thus, Germany "would purchase unity from the Russians at the expense of the nations in between."[15] Such reasoning must disturb the Russians to a great extent who always claim fears of a resurgent military Germany and upset those "nations in between" even more. Referring back to earlier discussion regarding the two historic trends of German foreign policy it is of interest to note the "Rapallo" trend expressed. Even though the West German government has diplomatic relations

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[14]Terence Prittie, "The Germans in Search of Unification," The Listener, February 24, 1955, as quoted by Freund, op. cit., p. 233.

[15]Ibid., p. 234.

only with the USSR among the bloc nations, it emphatically denies entertaining any "Rapallo" concepts.[16]

The opinions expressed above on the subject of reactionary views are by no means uniform. Variances occur as noted, for example, among the business men. They argue that since World War II there has been altogether too much emphasis on trading with the west, and this has led to too much dependence on western markets. Thus, more diversification should be sought and trade with eastern Europe should be enhanced to regain markets that Germany enjoyed in this area prior to World War II. Although West Germany has had no particular problem in finding markets for her goods it is wise to look toward the future. Moreover, from a political point of view national assertiveness is impeded by failing to have business dealings with an area that traditionally sought much of its imports in Germany.[17]

In West Germany there is also a group that is opposed to any relations with the Soviet bloc. This group consists of some of the Christian Democratic leaders, some civil servants, the Roman Catholic hierarchy and a sector of public opinion; they have some serious misgivings about increasing trade with the Soviet bloc and extending diplomatic relations to its nations.[18]

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[16]Crewe, op. cit., p. 415.

[17]Speier and Davison, op. cit., pp. 236-237, passim.

[18]Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 232.

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One group that favors increased contacts with the west is composed of members of the social democratic party, many civil servants including Foreign Office personnel, a number of persons in the upper social strata and some protestant members of the Christian democrats. They believe that West Germany should "take up diplomatic relations, multiply beneficial trade relations, and generally reacquaint the Eastern Europeans with Germany" in order to "strengthen the satellite states to become more self-reliant."[19] Of course, there are shades of opinions in this group as well, on such matters as the final disposition of the Oder-Neisse frontier or the Heimatsrecht Doctrine. Of interest in particular is the attitude of many of the civil servants who consider the Russians as representative of an Asiatic world, while the Germans consider themselves as completely western. Peoples such as Czechs and Poles are considered equally as western. Thus, they would not be adverse to compromise on border and refugee problems.[20] Eventually all the members of this category hope that by mutual contacts East Central Europe may through a process of evolution be swayed toward the west. The similarity between this reasoning and the second thread of German foreign policy, discussed earlier, is striking.

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[19] Freund, op. cit., p. 231.

[20] Speier and Davison, op. cit., pp. 123-124.

The expellee and refugee groups in West Germany quite naturally have predictable views. The voting sector of this group is present in the major political parties, a factor all West German politicians must consider in campaign platforms and campaign speeches; consequently, eastern border issues are most alive during election time. Since the advent of the sixties it has been reported that the organized expellee movements have lost much of their impetus, and many of their vociferous leaders lack mass support. Furthermore, their representation in the Bundestag has dwindled and the expellees and refugees are becoming absorbed more and more into West German life.[21]

The overall attitude of the West German population beyond governmental official circles has been described as one willing to abandon the idea of trying to reclaim the pre-war German territories in the east as a quid pro quo for closer relations with its eastern neighbors, in this case Poland. If this trend continues, an alleviation of a major tension spot could possibly occur.[22] All Poles, in and outside Poland, advocate retaining the present Oder-Neisse frontier, especially since any changes would necessitate more population transfers; furthermore, a large portion of the new Polish generation was born there.

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[21]Sarah Gainham, "Polanaise," The Spectator, vol. 208, no. 6982 (April 20, 1962), p. 498.

[22]Freund, op. cit., p. 90.

Satellite government arguments. Generally speaking, communist writers will expound on West German return to militarism because of her association with NATO. For example, the Eastern European press was particularly acid when ratifications for the European Defense Community were passed, since this would rearm the West Germans.[23] When more detailed discussions occur it must be remembered that the satellites will, of course, express themselves within a framework which is acceptable to the Kremlin. As will be seen in a later chapter the satellite governments have expressed a wish to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany. Since the USSR has done this, it is safe to assume that the green light has been given to the satellites to do likewise. Should the satellites themselves be insincere in these statements, they have no cause for concern, since the Hallstein Doctrine is likely to prevail.

In the case of the communist Poles, the German question to some apparently appears to involve a threefold consideration: relationships with East Germany, with West Germany and with a reunified Germany should this occur. The Rapacki Plan is offered as a political and military solution, while continuous trade with West Germany is advocated, probably for the simple reason that it is more convenient to Soviet interests for satellites to

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[23] The Times (London), March 31, 1953, p. 4.

purchase elsewhere those items which the Russians need themselves. However, Bonn is considered to be taking advantage of its position in NATO to seek a larger role for itself.[24]

The Yugoslav régime is not tied to the Kremlin apron-strings, but articles published in Yugoslavia express much the same opinions as do writings in the satellite countries. It views trade relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe favorably, urges the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line by the Bonn government and the abolition of the Hallstein and other doctrines.[25]

The latent fear of Germans in the countries bordering upon Germany is, of course, a convenient tool for the communist propaganda machine. This fear diminishes in those countries that are more distant. Another method of capitalizing on West Germany's past history is to exploit the many trials of wartime Nazis in East Central Europe for propaganda purposes. Furthermore, the rise in status of many old Nazis in West Germany adds

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[24]These views are expressed by communist writers in many articles such as: Manfred Lachs, "Poland's Quest for European Security," International Affairs (London), vol. 35, no. 3 (July, 1959), pp. 305-309; Klemens Keplicz, "Poland and the Two Germanies," New Statesman, vol. 54, no. 1377 (August 3, 1957), pp. 137-138; or Jerzy Kowalewski, "Two Tendencies in West Germany," Polish Perspectives, vol. IV, no. 4 (April, 1961), pp. 10-13.

[25]"Good News from Bonn and Tokyo," Review of International Affairs (Beograd), vol. XII, no. 261 (February 20, 1961), pp. 6-7; and L. Erven, "Freezing of the German Problem," Review of International Affairs (Beograd), vol. XII, no. 265 (April 20, 1961), pp. 9-10.

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selves. However, Poen is prepared to be taking advantage of its
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[73]These views are expressed by communist writers in many articles such as Eastern Lands. "Poland's Issue for Foreign Security," Informational Service (London), vol. 30, no. 3 (July, 1957), pp. 329-337; Eleanor Tomlin, "Poland and the Two Ger-many," The Statesman, vol. 34, no. 1377 (August 3, 1957), pp. 137-139; or Jerzy Zawadzki, "The Tomorrow in East Central Europe," Polish Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 4 (April, 1974), pp. 3-11.

[74]"Road Map Plan Does Not Help," Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 111, no. 321 (February 20, 1972), pp. 4-7; and L. Jones, "Freezing of the German Problem," Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 111, no. 319 (April 20, 1972), pp. 5-12.

fuel to the fire; one particularly shocking case involved the election in 1951 of ex-SS general Heinz Reineforth to the Schleswig-Hollstein State Assembly. This general is known to the Poles as the "Butcher of Warsaw" for atrocities committed against the underground in Warsaw during the uprising in August of 1944.[26]

Views of émigrés from East Central Europe. The émigrés from East Central Europe are generally the only ones who can speak for the population in this area apart from the governments which, of course, are only amplifiers of communism. As can be expected the reflections of the population vary geographically depending upon former relations with or memories of Germany or upon their proximity to the USSR.

Regarding the question of whether or not West Germany has had an Ostpolitik, arguments have been given indicating a wide range of beliefs. Juliusz Mieroszewski, a writer in the Polish émigré journal Kultura claims that the Germans have had none since the end of World War II. According to him, their thinking is just a continuation of traditional outlooks, which is estimated to be a collaboration with the Russians at the expense of the Poles in between.[27] This is quite natural, since all previous German-Polish collaboration has led to suffering for Poland. Referring

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[26]T.H. Tetens, The New Germany and the Old Nazis (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 61-62, passim.

[27]Juliusz Mieroszewski, "On the Grave of Ostpolitik," Kultura (Paris), no. 12/182 (December, 1962), pp. 92-93, passim. Trans. Professor Jan H. Wszelaki.

to the two trends discussed in chapter II, examples of Germans and Russians reaching across Poland are far more numerous than instances of German-Polish collaboration.

The opposite view is, of course, that West Germany has had an active Ostpolitik, but the international situation has put limits upon it. To support this view it has been pointed out that Germans have always been interested in East Central Europe and, no doubt, will continue to be. At the present this active policy is expressed two ways: first, through a continued survey of the area and secondly, by commercial relations. This survey is manifested by intensive study of the area in private institutions or organizations, such as the Institute for Eastern Europe in Munich. At present the Germans who were evicted from East Central Europe have brought with them a thorough knowledge of the area. Lately tourism is increasing with these Germans being permitted to revisit lands they have left. Of course, additionally, many Germans originally from West Germany travel in East Central Europe as well. In the economic field there is and has been a number of traveling West German economic commissions in East Central Europe, and these carry political overtones.[28]

An intermediate view in that West Germany has both a positive and a negative Ostpolitik. Its positive features consist of a

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[28] Mr. Constantin Visuiano, Washington, D.C. expressed these opinions to the author in an interview on July 5, 1963. This interview will hereinafter be cited as the Visuiano Interview.

desire for reconciliation with the population in East Central Europe, notably the Polish people who have suffered the maximum of illwill. Furthermore, West German leaders, in the case of Poland, realize that Poland is a permanent fixture and, consequently, wish to dispel any Polish apprehension of future German designs on the area. However, any implementation of the Rapacki Plan to secure international peace and order in Central Europe is not considered feasible by the Polish population inasmuch as everyone knows that foreign minister Rapacki is controlled by Moscow; therefore, any withdrawal of troops would mean withdrawal of U.S. troops from Central Europe which would be ominous.[29] On the negative side the Oder-Neisse river border dispute dominates West German Ostpolitik. This border that all Poles everywhere consider to be permanent, is not recognized by West Germany even though Adenauer has repeatedly renounced force to effect a settlement satisfactory to Germany. The Poles wonder just what German intentions may be regarding this frontier region.[30] It appears that many Poles believe, and many others share this belief, that the partition of Germany has resulted

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[29]Cf. ante Chapter III, p. 29

[30]Mr. Stefan Korbonski expressed these opinions to the author in an interview on July 9, 1963. This interview will hereinafter be cited as the Korbonski Interview.

in West Germany gaining the trust of the west. This division was a precondition to Franco-German rapprochement and the reconciliation between these two nations has done much to further European integration. Any policies leading to the reunification of East and West Germany should not jeopardize the trust the West Germans have so far gained.[31] In this connection, a declaration by the United States that in a future peace treaty it would consider the Oder-Neisse frontier a final border, would do much to alleviate present concern.[32]

Among the East Central European population there are signs that the attitude toward the German people is beginning to change. In 1958 a magazine article[33] in a Roman Catholic newspaper in Poland described the spirit of atonement that had gripped the present-day German. Considering the milieu in which this article was written, it is somewhat surprising that such a view ever was circulated. The writer maintained that militarism and military

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[31]Mieroszewski, op. cit., p. 94.

[32]Juliusz Mieroszewski, "Liberation, Containment i Co Dalej," Kultura (Paris), no. 6/172, 1962 as adapted under the title, "Eastern Europe: A Bridge between United States and Soviet Union," Central European Federalist, vol. I, no. 2 (December, 1962), p. 12.

[33]Written by Leopold Tyrmand in Tygodnik Powszechny, as quoted by Sidney Gruson, "Adenauer Shift on Warsaw Seen," The New York Times, March 17, 1958, p. 7.

tradition had been replaced by the concern over material well-being in the minds of the West German population. The author was ridiculed in the official and semi-official Polish press for even voicing such thoughts.

If one examines the attitude of a nation that geographically is one of the furthest removed from West Germany, similar thoughts are evident. Referring in this instance to Rumania, the population of this nation has always had a penchant for France and what it stands for. Admittedly there was an alliance during World War II with Nazi Germany, but popular support was weak. At present the Rumanian population, in the shadow of Russia and remembering the recent loss of Bessarabia, has begun to look to West Germany as a possible future barrier to Soviet encroachments. The economic growth of West Germany, its integration with Western Europe and the recent Franco-German Treaty of Reconciliation have materially contributed to this outlook.[34]

Looking at the Czech population a more cautious view is prevalent. There is more of a "wait and see" attitude. Of course, being closer to West Germany and having bad memories from the German occupation, the attitude of the people at large is bound to be colored accordingly. But the three factors that influenced the Rumanians also carry considerable weight in this country as well.[35]

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[34] Visuiano Interview.

[35] Dr. Jozef Lettrich expressed these opinions to the author in an interview on July 9, 1963. This interview will hereinafter be cited as the Lettrich Interview.

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In general, the opinion has been expressed that West Germany should make an effort to seek allies in eastern Europe. So far communist propaganda has made no distinction between the Third Reich and the Bundesrepublik.[36]

Regarding any prospective changes in West German foreign policy several émigré leaders seem to believe that with Schroeder as foreign minister and Erhard as chancellor there would be a continued economic outlook toward eastern Europe with increasing stress on economic considerations.[37] Of course it is rather conjectural to attempt to evaluate accurately the future course of a nation.

Summary

In the post-war European boom the West German population has been primarily absorbed in reconstruction and developing an affluence. On the political scene only certain groups are interested in foreign affairs and these set forth various opinions. West German foreign policy toward the east has centered primarily around the reunification and frontier issue with hopes of reconciliation with the various peoples of East Central Europe

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[36]Walter Dushnyck, "New Germany and Eastern Europe," Ukrainian Quarterly, vol. 17 (Winter, 1961), p. 308.

[37]For example, Dr. Visuiano and Dr. Lettrich.

In general, [illegible].[28]

[illegible].[29] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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[28] [illegible]

[29] [illegible]

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as a desired addition. The political opposition favors increased contacts between the two areas including diplomatic relations. The satellite governments are seeking, or so they say, diplomatic relations with West Germany. Furthermore, a demilitarized and denuclearized Germany would serve their purposes. Among the non-communist populations there is a growing realization of what has happened and is happening in Western Europe where a new German nation is participating in a different, prospering and rather closely integrated environment of which they would like to be a part, and in which West Germany may become a factor that could implement their national aspirations.

CHAPTER V

WEST GERMAN RELATIONS WITH EAST CENTRAL EUROPE, 1949-1955

In 1949 the three western zones of Germany were fused and a German government with a new constitution was established in Bonn. Military government ended in September 1949 when allied control was exercised through a civilian High Commission on which each of the three western allies were represented. This Commission was charged, in the name of the allies, with a number of functions, one being the management of foreign affairs of the new nation.

Political Relationships

As early as November 1949 in the first allied-German agreement negotiated by this Commission, the so called Petersberg Protocol, the new West German state entered the field of foreign affairs. This agreement, the most important provisions of which halted further dismantling of German industry, allowed West Germany to participate "in all these international organizations through which German experience and support can contribute to the general welfare" and to "initiate the gradual re-establishment of consular and commercial relations with those countries where such relations appear advantageous."[1] Adenauer's temperament, as

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[1]U.S. Department of State, "Dismantling in Germany Modified; Text of Protocol of Agreements, "Department of State Bulletin, vol. 21 (December 5, 1949), p. 863a.

CHAPTER 2

THE [illegible] AND THE [illegible] SYSTEM: [illegible]

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described earlier, revealed itself from the beginning: his autobiography shows that Adenauer was at times quite adamant and anxious to have his way in wording the communiqué.[2]

Regarding implementation of the Petersberg Protocol West Germany began by establishing its contacts with the free world as would be expected. In eastern Europe Stalin ruled a monolithic empire from which Yugoslavia was excluded in 1948. No political contacts between Stalin's empire and the West German government existed and this situation was to continue with hardly any change up until 1955 when West Germany became a full sovereign state, and 1956, when the Polish and Hungarian uprisings occurred, which influenced the outlook of the West German government.

However, Yugoslavia presented a different situation. Immediately following World War II Tito's stock was high in Moscow, and Belgrade was chosen as the seat for the new Cominform. However, after failing to bow to the Kremlin, Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party were expelled from the communist family in June of 1948. Western aid helped Tito to sustain his nation until after the death of Stalin when diplomatic relations were renewed between Yugoslavia and the USSR and its satellites. During the early fifties West Germany and Yugoslavia initiated a rapproachement which led to an

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[2]Paul Weymar, Adenauer, His Authorized Biography, trans. Peter de Mendelssohn (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1957), p. 290 et seq.

exchange of ambassadors. West Germany's economy at that time was beginning to feel the fruits of the European Recovery Program, something the Yugoslavs did not fail to note. As early as 1950 a West German trade mission was established in Yugoslavia. This trade mission also contained a consular section. Furthermore, the Germans nominated an economic expert as ambassador, and ambassadors were exchanged around the New Year, 1952.[3] The Yugoslavs, on their part, expressed their wish to establish contacts with West German Social Democratic leaders and trade union officials as well.[4] Popular backing did not appear to support the ties with Yugoslavia. For example, a few years later such a flood of protest letters descended upon the Bavarian State Radio prior to a broadcast of a taped speech by the president of the Yugoslav parliament that a last minute cancellation resulted.[5]

Economic Relationships

Although political relations between West Germany and the

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[3] Mr. Joerg Kastl, First Secretary, German Embassy, Washington, D.C. in an interview at the Embassy on July 15, 1963, hereinafter cited as the Kastl Interview of July 15, 1963.

[4] M.S. Handler, "Yugoslavs Foster West German Ties," The New York Times, November 17, 1952, p. 11.

[5] The New York Times, May 9, 1954, p. 49.

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satellite governments were out of the question, the economic aspects belonged to a completely different sphere. As has been pointed out previously lack of diplomatic relations does not preclude economic transactions, and German economic interests have been longstanding in East Central Europe.

In 1947 a Joint Export and Import Agency (JEIA) was created to supervise German foreign trade under the occupation; this agency lasted until 1955. However, there were a number of countries with which there were no JEIA agreements, and in December, 1952, the so called Ostausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft (the Eastern Committee of German Economy) was created at the suggestion of the federal government. This Eastern Committee filled in those areas lacking these JEIA agreements. This committee still exists and is of great importance to West German-East European trade. It is supported by five organizations: the Federation of German industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie), the Association of German Chambers of Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag), the Central Association of German Banks and Bankers (Zentralverband des Banken- und Bankiergewerbes), the Central Association of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade (Gesamtverband des Deutschen Gross- und Aussenhandels) and the Import Association (Importverband).[6] Upon its creation this Eastern Committee was

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[6]Wenzel Jaksch, Germany and Eastern Europe (Bonn: Edition Atlantic-Forum, 1962), p. 23.

designated by the Federal Ministry of Economics as the only organization in West Germany competent to deal with the problem of improving trade relations with Eastern Europe, excluding East Germany and Yugoslavia. Of course, the allied High Commissioners' approval was needed and this was secured. The functions of the Eastern Committee have been described as follows:

> 1. To advise the Federal Government and German economic organizations on trade with the East.
>
> 2. To centralize requests from German concerns that may desire trade with eastern European countries and to assist their representatives to conclude agreements.
>
> 3. Pending the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc, to send unofficial delegations to those countries for the purpose of negotiating trade and payments agreements with the approval of the Federal Government and the Allied High Commission.
>
> 4. To work out delivery and payment conditions and the legal aspects of agreements.
>
> 5. To prepare documentation on the economic development of Soviet bloc countries and to keep German economic organizations posted on new commercial possibilities and conditions in Eastern Europe that have changed radically since World War II.[7]

The Eastern Committee, although a private organization, could not help but gain an aura of semi-officialdom since it was sanctioned by the Ministry of Economics. It has grown in importance and has become a pressure group exerting its influence upon

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[7] M.S. Handler, "Bonn Unit to Seek Soviet Bloc Trade," The New York Times, December 19, 1952, p. 5.

the federal government in general and Chancellor Adenauer in particular.

The Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian and Rumanian governments, in turn, have had permanent trade representatives in Frankfurt am Main ever since 1949. In fact, before the creation of the Bonn government, they were located in Berlin. These representatives also handle trade matters for those satellite governments which are not represented in West Germany.[8] On the administrative side there have been complaints ever since the war that cumbersome visa procedures delay commerce in that technicians and mechanics needed for installing exported machinery are delayed in their travels; likewise, travel to West Germany by East Europeans is equally cumbersome in that travel permits are slowly processed.[9]

In the area of trade agreements one of the first reported instances took place in April of 1952 with Yugoslavia. Since diplomatic relations were in existence this presented no problem. This agreement was centered around the Yugoslav zone of Trieste which in the past received consular goods from Italy. Under barter arrangements and in conjunction with Austria West Germany

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[8]Kastl Interview of July 15, 1963.

[9]Jaksch, loc. cit.

furnished machinery, sewing machines, kitchen utensils, etc., in exchange for bauxite, marble, agricultural and fish products.[10] Short term credits were granted to Yugoslavia, but by 1954 its government attempted to gain long term credits from West Germany.[11]

In the early summer of 1952, Hans Kroll, the head of the East-West Trade Department of the Ministry of Economics announced that trade pacts with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary had been concluded. These were modest agreements. To give some indication of the scope of trade, exports from Poland, the largest exporter of the three, amounted to $110 million. In this case as with other Western allies, trade embargoes affecting strategic materials in the general east-west trade had to be considered.[12] These agreements, as well as others concluded with East Central European governments were short term, generally about a year in duration. Some variations occurred, such as extensions for a few months. Agreements for as long as a duration of seventeen months have been signed, as for example with Bulgaria in

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[10] The Times (London), April 15, 1952, p. 3.

[11] Jack Raymond, "Belgrade Forging Soviet Trade Link," The New York Times, November 13, 1954, p. 6.

[12] The New York Times, June 8, 1952, p. 6.

August of 1952.[13] For the sake of continuity and ease of evaluation, import and export statistics will be discussed in the following chapter. However, it should be emphasized that the amounts involved were modest, but always increasing from year to year.

By comparison trade with the USSR was late in starting. It was practically non-existent up until 1954. The West German Economics Minister stated once during this period that bilateral trade discussions with the Soviet Union were out of the question. If talks were to be held, they would have to be conducted through the United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe[14] on which all European nations that are UN members are represented, including in addition West Germany and Switzerland.

Summary

The relations between West Germany and East Central Europe during the first half of the fifties existed only in the economic sphere, with the exception of Yugoslavia with which diplomatic relations were established as the international scene made this a realistic venture.

An important foundation for trade relations with Eastern Europe was created in the so called Eastern Committee which represented the Federal Republic in East Europe as far as trade was

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[13] The New York Times, August 7, 1952, p. 5.

[14] The Times (London), May 27, 1953, p. 4.

concerned, although it was a private organization.

Outside of this sphere propaganda exchanges and similar recriminatory outbursts characterized this period. The satellites, of course, have continued their propaganda barrage to date, but with fluctuations in conformance with Kremlin policy. As West Germany entered the second half of the fifties there were changes in Eastern Europe and some increased contacts as the following chapter will show.

CHAPTER VI

WEST GERMAN RELATIONS WITH EAST CENTRAL EUROPE, 1955-1961

The year 1955 was a turning point for West Germany. In May of that year this nation gained the status of a full sovereign, became a member of NATO and was authorized to create military forces of her own within the limitations imposed by the Paris Accords by way of the Western European Union. The Soviet Union with its European satellites created the Warsaw Pact as a countermeasure. As early as 1952 West Germany joined the Benelux countries, France and Italy in the European Coal and Steel Community, the first supranational organization in Western Europe. Later, in 1958 these same nations formed the European Economic Community - or as it is more commonly known, the Common Market - and the European Atomic Energy Community - or EURATOM. As previous discussion has shown, West Germany has always been primarily Western or European oriented in its foreign policy, and the implementation of this western outlook can be seen in West German participation in these activities.

May 1955 - October 1956

In the year 1955 the Soviet Union also conceded that West Germany was a soverign state and exchanged ambassadors with her. This occurred in September 1955 in the "Geneva Spirit" as the period immediately following the July summit meeting has been characterized. Thus, the new Soviet leadership of Khrushchev and Bulganin

accepted de jure the existence of two Germanies.

Political aspects. As the Soviet Union officially recognized West Germany, the satellite governments apparently were allowed to make similar arrangements should the opportunity arise. In September of 1955 the communist newspaper Scanteia of Rumania stated that the Rumanian government sought diplomatic relations with West Germany.[1] In January 1956 the first meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact took place in Prague. References to West Germany occur in the declaration issued at the end of the meeting. This particular declaration stresses peace and friendship with mention of the Geneva summit meeting the previous summer, but with no reference to the unsuccessful foreign ministers' meeting the previous autumn. In the text of the declaration it was stated, inter alia, that "the establishment of good neighborly relations between ... Czechoslovakia and Federal Germany would be of great significance."[2] Additionally, non-aggression pacts would contribute beneficially between nations to improve relations.[3] A few weeks earlier a Czech official had stated that the Czech government recognized the German Federal republic and its government, and it sought diplomatic relations and good neighborly relations with it.[4] Five months after the Warsaw Pact

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[1]The New York Times, September 16, 1955, p. 12.

[2]The New York Times, January 29, 1956, p. 43.

[3]Loc. cit.

[4]Ibid., January 2, 1956.

meeting the Czechs and the Hungarians on the same day issued further statements, the former for a non-aggression pact and the latter for diplomatic relations. In these cases as in all others the above described Hallstein Doctrine was invoked by West Germany.[5] But no political adjustment originating from West Germany occurred during this time period.

A different situation developed in Yugoslavia. At this point it should be noted, however, that a rapprochement between Tito and the Kremlin leaders began to affect Yugoslav-West German relations. In the busy month of May, 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Tito on a trip that resembled a Canossa journey. Tito again became respectable in the communist community and relations continued to improve culminating in what is best described as a "smiling" visit by Tito to Moscow one year later. In his relations with West Germany Tito was quite adamant on settling claims against Germany which had accrued from the Nazi occupation during World War II. In July 1955, the West German government declared that it was ready to commence negotiations on this subject.[6] In a speech on July 23 Tito stated that the claim amounted to a minimum of $100 million and that he was not going to back down from this sum.[7] Consequently, the West German

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[5]The Times (London), August 2, 1956, p. 6.

[6]Ibid., July 14, 1955.

[7]Ibid., July 28, 1955.

government received a note seeking payment of this amount.[8] The apparent reason for Tito's adopting this belligerent attitude after several years of friendly relations, has been attributed to German delaying tactics, a vacant West German ambassadorship in Belgrade since the preceeding December and a recently negotiated compensation treaty amounting to two and a half million dollars between Yugoslavia and East Germany.[9] Naturally the West German government would find this latter agreement particularly objectionable. To add fuel to the fire, in March 1954, the Soviet Union proclaimed that its relations with East Germany would be the same as with any sovereign state, and it granted by treaty full sovereign status to East Germany in September 1955. In March of 1956 a settlement was reached regarding German war claims: a cash payment of $14.5 million and about a $60 million cash credit for purchase of West German goods. In addition Yugoslavia was granted until 1968 to repay some postwar commercial debts at a rate of 3%, a reduction from 7%.[10]

Technical cooperation. If it is advantageous for communist governments to cooperate with non-communist governments to further their interests, ideological considerations do not stand

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[8] Ibid., August 13, 1955.

[9] Jack Raymond, "Yugoslavia Irked by Bonn's Delay," The New York Times, August 13, 1955, p. 2.

[10] The New York Times, March 8, 1956.

in the way. An example of this is evident in the Danube River Commission. This river has had a colorful history in international affairs, including the post-war period. After Stalin's death the Danubian nations were permitted more control of the maritime affairs of the river. Included to some extent in the Danubian nations is now West Germany. In July of 1955 a West German delegation signed a bilateral shipping agreement with Rumania wherein West German shipping was granted access to Danubian ports in Rumania and vice versa.[11] Additionally, since June, 1957, representatives from West Germany and Austria, as well, have attended the sessions of the Danube River Commission as experts. As a side issue it is of interest to note that the Common Market is also represented at these meetings.[12] Thus, at present, the Danube Commission is an international technical organization including both east and west representation. A further bilateral attempt for mutual accomodation in river traffic occurred in July of 1956 when West Germany and Czechoslovakia desired to regulate traffic on the Elbe.[13]

Economic agreements. Economic agreements continued to be concluded with East Central Europe with quite a sharp rise in

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[11] The Times (London), July 4, 1955.

[12] Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 452

[13] The Times (London, fourth edition), July 27, 1956, p. 10.

scope, notably with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The yearly trade agreement with Czechoslovakia happened most likely by chance, to be concluded almost simultaneously with the just-mentioned Warsaw Pact meeting. Consequently, the Czech announcement of the conclusion of this agreement was intertwined with good will pronouncements, such as "the exchange of goods between various countries leads not only to a continuous increasing of volume of trade but also to the creation of more friendly relations between nations."[14]

Besides trade agreements payments agreements were also drawn up. Due to convertibility difficulties arrangements were generally made by U.S. dollar clearing, but dating from 1955 a satellite government would have in West Germany a non-interest bearing German mark account to which the Germans would make payments for imports from a satellite government while the latter in turn could use this account to pay for purchases in West Germany. Corresponding arrangements were made in the satellite nations for the West Germans. This development was a result of increased convertibility of West European currencies brought about by the European Payments Union of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation,[15] the international organization which dispensed Marshall aid in Europe.

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[14]Sidney Gruson, "Prague and Bonn Will Widen Trade, "The New York Times, January 31, 1956, p. 3.

[15]The Times (London), October 31, 1955 and Kastl Interview of July 15, 1963.

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[illegible] Times, [illegible] [illegible], "[illegible] New York Times, January 16, 1966, p. 3.

[illegible] Times (London), October 24, 1966 and Times Literary Supplement of July 21, 1967.

Red Cross agreements. In the field of human relations certain accomplishments were achieved during this period. The forced expulsions resulting from the implementation of the Potsdam Protocol came to an end in 1951. In 1950 and 1951 the International Red Cross arranged for some 45,000 Germans to leave Poland and 17,000 to leave Czechoslovakia. In 1952 at a meeting in Toronto the International Red Cross had passed a resolution calling upon national Red Cross societies to facilitate family reunions of those individuals separated as a result of World War II. In 1953 the president of the West German Red Cross society, Finance Minister Weitz, had addressed a number of letters to his opposite numbers in Moscow, Prague, Budapest, Warsaw and Bucharest, but without results. In 1955 the Poles, for example, had unilaterally allowed 627 German nationals to return, although there were many more who wished to leave. Since this group included skilled workers, the Polish government was not too anxious to let them leave, and some attempts to satisfy their wishes had been undertaken notably by letting them speak German and permitting their children to use German in school.[16]

In early December Dr. Weitz and two assistants appeared in Warsaw and met with the Vice-President of the Polish Red Cross, Dr. Helles-Kreuz. They agreed orally that monthly some 800 to 1000

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[16] Walter Sullivan, "German's Return Begun by Poland," The New York Times, January 6, 1956, p. 2.

Germans would be allowed to leave Poland during 1956 and 1957. Some discussion took place over the definition of separated family members, but the two parties agreed that separated spouses and parents whose support was needed for their children would make up the bulk of the German nationals to be allowed to leave Poland. During the same meeting Dr. Weitz arranged for customs-free packages to be sent to German prisoners in Poland. However, he was unsuccessful in attempting to secure amnesty for prisoners who had served over ten years of their sentences.[17] In return Dr. Weitz promised to attempt to gain similar concessions for Polish nationals in West Germany.

In January 1956, as agreed upon, German nationals began to arrive in somewhat larger numbers than expected. In contrast to the misery that the expelles experienced in the late forties, these migrations appeared orderly and household effects would follow in sealed freight cars.[18] In the middle of June the President of the Polish Red Cross, Dr. Domanska, and the Secretary-General of this organization, Mr. Olizniewski, paid a return visit to Bonn.[19] At the time of the expiration of the agreement in December of 1957 some 60,000 Germans had left Poland. It has been

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[17]"Rotkreuz-Vernandlungen in Warschau," Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Heft 1 (January, 1956), p. 10.

[18]Sullivan, loc. cit.

[19]"Polnische Rotkreuz - Delegation in Bonn," Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Heft 7 (July, 1956), p. 15.

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reported that another 50,000 were anxious to leave,[20] but the exodus of Germans since then has been curtailed, although the Polish authorities have unilaterally permitted some Germans to leave after the expiration of the agreement.[21]

In 1956 Dr. Weitz successfully concluded an oral agreement with the Czech Red Cross society. In this agreement the Czechs allowed up to 160,000 German nationals to leave Czechoslovakia. As can be expected most of these people were Sudeten Germans. In fact, during the preceeding years the Czechs had been quite liberal in allowing Germans on both sides of the border to cross over for family reunions. Dr. Weitz and his Czech colleague also agreed upon exchanging a certain number of prisoners.[22] Since the standard of living is somewhat higher in Czechoslovakia only 50,000 of the 160,000 were expected to leave at the time of the negotiations.

From August to October 1956, similar negotiations took place in Bucharest which resulted in an agreement to allow members of families to unite in Germany.[23] As will be noted later

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[20]Sidney Gruson, "Most Germans Quitting Poland, Disillusioned by Red Pledges," The New York Times, December 4, 1957, p. 30.

[21]Kastl Interview of July 15, 1963.

[22]The New York Times, August 14, 1956, p. 1, and The Times (London), August 14, 1956, p. 7.

[23]Hubatsch, op. cit., p. 177.

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the execution of this agreement has not been too successful.

Some of these agreements were, as shown, fairly successful, especially in the case of Poland. It should be noted that these agreements were between private organizations, which eliminated political difficulties. Nevertheless, Herr Beitz as Finance Minister, lent an aura of officialdom to his missions while on the satellite side, all organizations in a communist country come under the party's all-inclusive umbrella. At any rate, the Red Cross societies served as a convenient and non-official channel of communication.

October 1956 - October 1957

Within one short year West Germany went through a cycle of a positive outlook toward East Central Europe to a negative reaction in the political sphere. In October and November of 1956 Poland gained a measure of autonomy from the installation of the Gomułka régime, and Hungary suffered the results of an unsuccessful uprising. These events had a measure of influence in Germany. The German public's reaction can be seen from the earlier introduced public opinion poll[24] where it was shown that in the period from June 1956 to November 1956 the percentage for good terms with the United States decreased from 38 to 31 and the percentage for West German neutrality increased from 54 to 62. As expected the percentage voting for good terms with the USSR also decreased from 4 to 2.

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[24]Vide supra ch. IV, p. 41.

The discussion of closer ties with the East. The German government took due note of these events. Thoughts of closer relations especially with the new Polish government were prevalent. As early as October 1956 von Brentano said that "a growth of parliamentary forms and democratic procedures in Poland could pave the way for a new and mutually advantageous relationship between Bonn and Warsaw."[25] Some six weeks later von Brentano expressed his hopes that negotiations with Poland could be undertaken "in a European spirit" including some "provisional" arrangement on the Oder-Neisse frontier, and the gradual evolution of satisfactory cultural, economic and perhaps in time, political relationships.[26] At the end of the year von Brentano said he was ready to offer sacrifices to Poland in exchange for reunification[27] without elaborating on the nature of the sacrifices and Poland's contribution to the reunification of Germany. The Social Democrats in the Bundestag reminded von Brentano that the Poles were anxious to improve relationships with Germany and the latter stated that the border issue "need not cause a head-on clash in Polish-German aspirations."[28] However, no concrete action ever resulted and the year of 1957 produced only further statements. The West German Foreign

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[25]Arthur J. Olsen, "East German Moves Seen," The New York Times, October 26, 1956, p. 11.

[26]Arthur J. Olsen, "Bonn Hints Talks on Polish Border," The New York Times, December 15, 1956, p. 1.

[27]The Times (London), December 28, 1956, p. 5.

[28]Arthur J. Olsen, "Bonn Tie Called Goal of Poland," The New York Times, December 29, 1956, p. 3.

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Office thought in terms of improved economic relations and perhaps diplomatic relations with the Oder-Neisse question "reserved in special documents."[29] This latter thought was one that gained favor especially among the Social Democrats. However, the Poles tied in the problem of the Oder-Neisse line as a condition for diplomatic relations; of course, the West German government never has been prepared as yet to go this far, although during this period there was much serious thinking that perhaps the Hallstein Doctrine could be circumvented by putting Poland in the same category as the Soviet Union. Thus, since Poland administered certain pre-war German territories she could qualify as an occupation power. The Poles, on the other hand, did not look favorably on this proposition, since they wanted an out-right German recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier.[30]

Human relationships. The uprising in Hungary in October and November, 1956, created a steady stream of refugees. Some 4,000 German nationals left Hungary for Austria and some 800 for Yugoslavia. In May, 1957, the German and Hungarian Red Cross societies concluded an agreement to allow family reunions.[31] This was the last of the above-mentioned letters to receive an answer; it should be noted in passing that some agreement notably

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[29] M.S. Handler, "Bonn Considering Ties with Poland," The New York Times, January 19, 1957, p. 6.

[30] Freund, op. cit., p. 197.

[31] Hubatsch, op. cit., pp. 177-178.

on the release of prisoners of war had been concluded with the USSR at the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations. To complete this issue, German nationals all along had been allowed to leave Yugoslavia and totaled 60,625 by the end of 1960.[32]

In the spring following the Hungarian uprising, it was reported that the West Germans sent some 5,000 tons of barley and oats seed valued at one million dollars to Hungary. The sale was made to the international Red Cross while a four man team from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations supervised the distribution of this grain among the farmers.[33]

West German-Yugoslav relations. This time period, October 1956 to October 1957, started out auspiciously with a more positive outlook toward East Central Europe. However, West German-Yugoslav relations deteriorated sharply resulting in an altered West German viewpoint.

In February of 1956 Khrushchev delivered his now famous "de-Stalinization" speech which of course met with great approval, since Tito's independent "road to socialism" now was ideologically correct according to Moscow. In the Hungarian uprising Tito supported Soviet action, but although Tito moved

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[32] Ibid.

[33] The Times (London), February 9, 1957, p. 5.

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[illegible] The Times (London), February 7, 1977, p. 1.

closer to the socialist camp, relations between him and Khrushchev were not always too cordial. However, in the fall of 1957 Tito decided to grant diplomatic recognition to East Germany. At this point the Yugoslav dictator was more sure of his support in the Soviet bloc. He was recognized as the head of his own country by Khrushchev and had received credits from the USSR amounting to $250 million, especially welcome in a nation which has a chronically unfavorable trade balance. Furthermore, as a leader of the so called neutrals he advocated abolition of military blocs, "non-alignment", "active coexistence" and echoed, in general, the Soviet foreign policy jargon.[34] It has also been pointed out that it is believed that he feared German reunification, and thus took this step as a precaution, the Hallstein Doctrine notwithstanding.[35]

In the face of the announced recognition of East Germany by Yugoslavia the West German government was faced with invoking the Hallstein Doctrine and severing diplomatic relations or at least imposing some sort of punishment upon Tito as a warning to others who might entertain similar ideas. Economic sanctions were contemplated, such as withholding restitution payments on the World War II war claims settlement. In the end Adenauer

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[34] Editorial in The New York Times, October 16, 1957, p. 34.

[35] F. Yorick Blumenfeld, "Yugoslav Nationalism," Editorial Research Reports, 1961: vol. II (November 29, 1961), p. 870.

was content to sever diplomatic relations.[36] Of course, it would be of interest to know to what degree West Germany's allies were consulted or involved in this issue.

West Germany broke relations on October 19, 1957. The West German ambassador in Yugoslavia, Kurt Georg Pfleiderer, was a most vociferous opponent to the Hallstein Doctrine, but he died shortly before these events took place, and the views of Secretary of State Hallstein and his director of the Legal and Political Division of the Foreign Office, Grewe, prevailed.[37] Some West German-Polish relations reportedly underway at this time were cut off,[38] and the Polish newspaper Tribuna Ludu harshly criticized the West German act saying that this would certainly rule out any hope for diplomatic negotiations.[39]

This Yugoslav act did affect West German thinking and acted, in a way, as a cold shower. The Poles complained, no doubt justifiably, because it appears that Bonn decided that diplomatic relations with fickle communist governments was a risky business, although relations remained unbroken with the

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[36] M.S. Handler, "Bonn Discusses Tito with Allies," The New York Times, October 17, 1922, p. 22.

[37] Freund, op. cit., p. 198.

[38] Ibid., p. 197.

[39] M.S. Handler, "Bonn Severs Ties with Yugoslavia," The New York Times, October 20, 1957, p. 4.

USSR. The political statements by West German officials regarding German policies with East Central Europe dwindled and as will be shown below, the West German government had to start more or less anew in building up an approach to East Central Europe.

In spite of this West German feeling it must be emphasized that the door was not completely closed between West Germany and Yugoslavia; the embassies in the two countries were closed down, but consular relations remained. A West German consulate is still functioning in Zagreb. Trade relationships were not affected. The scope of German exports continued to increase. In fact, the following spring another yearly agreement was concluded with the Germans announcing that this did not have any bearing on political matters.[40] France took over West German interests in Yugoslavia, and Sweden Yugoslavia's in West Germany. Nevertheless, there is a West German First Secretary attached to the French Embassy in Belgrade and a Yugoslav First Secretary attached to the French Embassy in Bonn.[41]

November 1957 - October 1961

Following the severance of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Yugoslavia a period of inactivity ensued

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[40] The New York Times, May 8, 1958.

[41] Kastl Interview of July 15, 1963.

followed by a moderately increasing interest in eastern affairs.

The year 1958. At the beginning of the year 1958 the West German foreign office underwent extensive reorganization, but Foreign Minister von Brentano did not emphasize eastern affairs in this reshuffling.[42] No major statements were published regarding the satellite nations; however, West German and Yugoslav Ambassadors in Rome met in October in order to try to repair the damaged relations between the two nations. The Yugoslavs took the initiative in starting these secret negotiations, but they broke down after six months. The Yugoslavs insisted on maintaining ties with East Germany. Although the West Germans did not insist on a direct break between the two, they wanted the Yugoslavs to reduce contacts to a minimum. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Kardelj, considered this "irreconcilable with independence of our foreign policy."[43] Since that time West Germany and Yugoslavia have attempted to reach agreement in secret negotiations held from time to time, but so far without success.[44]

Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Geneva, May - August, 1959, and its effect upon West Germany's East European Policy. As stated previously the Foreign Ministers of the United States,

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[42]The Times (London), February 1, 1958, p. 5.

[43]Sidney Gruson, "Belgrade Halts Talks with Bonn," The New York Times, March 17, 1959, p. 11.

[44]Kastl Interview of July 15, 1963.

Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union met without success in Geneva in October 1955 in the aftermath of the Geneva summit meeting. They met again in Geneva in May of 1959 as a result of the Soviet Union's intransigeance over the German problem in general and Berlin in particular.[45] Within this framework West Germany entered into the question with hopes of a solution leading towards unification and the possibility of concluding non-aggression pacts with her closest satellite neighbors. It should be recalled that at this conference, the West German delegates, Foreign Minister von Brentano and Ambassador Grewe, sat around the conference table with the East German Foreign Minister.

Before the meeting in Geneva, West Germany participated in discussions in Washington where a strategy was developed with the approval of the United States, Great Britain and France. At the meeting itself much of the discussion centered around the issue of how to effect a reunification of Germany. As a side issue, the West German government with the approval of Chancellor Adenauer was prepared to offer non-aggression pacts with all the satellite governments except Albania. This was proffered reportedly as a reply to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's remark that Germany's neighbors do not know what the purpose of German foreign policy is.[46] As the talks at Geneva continued without success West

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[45]U.S. Senate, 87 Cong., 1st Sess., Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 456.

[46]Sydney Gruson, "Bonn Plans No-War Pacts With the Poles and Czechs," The New York Times, May 21, 1959, p. 29.

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German attitude changed. As expected, refugee groups placed considerable pressure on the government to abstain from such a move,[47] and some believe that these groups succeeded in thwarting the institution of these pacts.[48] Consequently, no concrete proposals ensued and Adenauer stated publicly that the time just was not ripe for such steps,[49] while the German delegates in Geneva expressed themselves more diplomatically by saying that they agreed "in principle" to these pacts.[50]

It appears, however, that at the onset of the Geneva conference Adenauer hoped for better relationships with East Central Europe. Had the conference been successful these nonaggression pacts may well have been drawn up. However, this was not the case and, additionally, the refugee groups achieved their goal.[51]

The twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. September 1, 1959, was the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II when Nazi Germany attacked Poland. Some observance of this occasion was expected from West Germany, since this would be an opportune moment to achieve better terms with the Poles.

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[47] The Times (London), July 31, 1959, p. 6.

[48] Kastl Interview of March 11, 1963.

[49] The Times (London), July 28, 1959, p. 8.

[50] The New York Times, July 28, 1959, p. 4.

[51] "Stillborn Pacts," The Economist, vol. 192 (August 8, 1959), pp. 337-338.

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However, this date was preceded by inopportune developments, the breakdown of the Geneva Conference being one example. One week earlier the West German press reported on the discussions among the Christian Democrats regarding membership on a delegation to be sent to the International Parliamentary Union's meeting to take place on September 1, 1959. When the Polish government found out that four of the nine designated to participate belonged to refugee organizations, it objected strenuously; this resulted in the attendance of one obscure German.[52]

On August 31 Adenauer made a broadcast. Some of the more salient excerpts are as follows:

> Today I must say a special word about that nation which, as a result of the invasion by the troops of Hitler's Germany and of the Soviet Union, was the first victim of the war. I mean the Polish nation. For more than a century that likeable people, without being in any way to blame, suffered from the political and warlike conflicts in Europe; thrice was their country torn asunder and partitioned; and twenty years ago they were the first victims of the second world war when Hitler's Germany and the Soviet Union invaded that country and cruelly destroyed it..... I say with complete conviction that this Germany, the new Germany, will one day be a good neighbor to Poland ....
>
> During the past ten years, I have, as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany repeatedly stated - and I repeat that statement today - that it will be our endeavor to establish respect and sympathy between the Germany of today and the Polish people so that out of these elements a genuine friendship may some day develop.[53]

In his speech Adenauer made due reference to Nazi Germany

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[52]Arthur J. Olsen, "Bonn Said to Lack Policy on Poland," The New York Times, August 23, 1959, p. 7.

[53]The German Embassy, Washington, D.C., "After Twenty Years: Germany and Poland," News From the German Embassy, vol. 3, no. 11 (September 2, 1959).

and the USSR as the main contributors to Polish suffering. Adenauer had insisted on making this point and on stressing the partitions of Poland.[54] The German press commented on this speech by pointing out that one speech could not effect a change of heart when Poland had been neglected for such a long time.[55]

The Polish government was not in a receptive mood. It is quite obvious that this type of speech could undermine the security of a communist government, but more likely, the Kremlin was not inclined to look with favor on this speech, since the breakdown of the foreign ministers' meeting a few weeks earlier.

On September 1, 1959, the Polish Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz gave a speech, in a way replying to Adenauer's. He stressed German remilitarization and imperialism, purposely demonstrated to President Eisenhower after his very recent visit to West Germany and to Khrushchev because of his impending visit to the United States. He also delivered this broadside:

> Adenauer, who tries to paralyze all peace initiatives, is still living. On the twentieth anniversary of the Hitler attack he shed a few crocodile tears and tried to drive a wedge between Poland and the Soviet Union.[56]

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[54] "Bonn and Warsaw," New Republic, vol. 141, no. 13 (September 28, 1959), p. 4.

[55] German Embassy, op. cit., p. 3 contains press reactions to Adenauer's August 31, 1959 broadcast.

[56] v on Siegler, op. cit., Hauptband II, p. 302. The translation is based on a German version of the Pole's speech.

The following day the West German Foreign Ministry stated that the broadcast was a gesture of good will and no foreign policy changes were to be expected. Adenauer was quite disappointed over the Polish reaction, and reportedly in a quandary because President Eisenhower had expressed during his recent visit to Bonn his anxiety over West German difficulties in ameliorating relations with Poland.[57] On October 13, 1959, Adenauer spoke at a luncheon to the Foreign Press Association and said that as far as he was concerned there would be no diplomatic relations with satellite governments, particularly Poland.[58]

In the Bundestag the opposition did not concur. In October a heated foreign policy debate took place, the first full scale one in nineteen months on the pros and cons of the Hallstein Doctrine.[59] In addition to that, a Social Democrat had just returned from a visit to Warsaw and stated that Germans should acquaint themselves more fully with Polish sentiment toward the Germans. Polish mistrust was not surprising when account is taken of the fact that one Pole out of every five was

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[57]The Times (London), September 9, 1959, p. 9.

[58]Sidney Gruson, "Adenauer Vetoes Eastern Europe Ties," The New York Times, October 14, 1959, p. 13; and von Siegler, op. cit., Hauptband II, p. 315.

[59]The New York Times, October 9, 1959, p. 4.

killed during World War II and that half of Warsaw's population perished during that period.[60]

Human, cultural and religious relationships. Red Cross agreements, previously described, functioned fairly satisfactorily except in the case of Rumania. In late 1958 Rumania suspended its agreement with West Germany as a result of the arrest of two Rumanians by German authorities.[61] A later suspension took place in January of 1959, when West Germany applied economic sanctions against Rumania because of her unwillingness to repatriate German nationals.[62] This did affect trade to some extent, but it probably affected the Germans who could not leave even more. This embargo lasted for nine months and was lifted on October 1, 1959.[63] But West Germany continued to experience difficulties. One tactic adopted was the so called Menschenhandel - Trade of Humans - method originated by those Jewish people in Rumania who bought their way out of Rumania to emigrate to Israel. The Germans have not been too successful in buying back their nationals.[64]

Cultural ties were slow to begin after the 1956 uprisings in Eastern Europe and exchanges were limited to arrangements made

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[60] The Times (London), September 9, 1959, p. 9.

[61] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1959-1960, p. 16656.

[62] The Times (London), January 16, 1959.

[63] The New York Times, October 10, 1959, p. 5.

[64] Kastl Interview of July 15, 1963.

among private groups. Once started, these contacts grew rapidly although unsystematically. The West Germans have press exchange arrangements with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the West German newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Welt have correspondents in Warsaw. Similarly there are Polish reporters in Bonn and Berlin. Newspaper correspondents are also exchanged between West Germany and Yugoslavia. In 1957 technical arrangements were concluded providing for the connection of West German and East German television facilities, thus enabling Eurovision to be seen in Eastern Europe.[65] There are no reports, however, on how frequently this arrangement is utilized.

Carefully selected West German moving pictures are shown in Eastern Europe, and once a joint West German-Polish company produced a moving picture which the Polish government refused to show in Poland.[66]

Since the advent of the 1960's an increased number of book translations began to be published. In 1961 some 160 titles of East European literature were translated which amounted to seven per cent of all foreign language literature translated into German. Ninety seven Russian books were translated, followed by eighteen Czech and thirteen Polish. Over 600 West German titles have been translated into Russian, close

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[65]"The Soviet Bloc and West Germany," Eastern Europe, vol. 10, no. 6 (June, 1961), pp. 3-9.

[66]Ibid.

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to 160 into Czech and over 100 into Polish, and in lesser numbers into other East Central European languages. Since the sixties it appears that West Germany leads the other western European nations in developing an interest in Eastern European art and literature.[67] In January, 1963, the manager of the Krupp Industries, Berthold Beitz, of whom much more will be told later, arranged for the first post-war exhibition of contemporary Polish paintings and drawings.[68]

Tourism in Eastern Europe also increased during this time period. Of course, a large percentage consisted of Germans visiting relatives in Eastern Europe. For example, in 1959 some 40,000 tourists visited Poland and one quarter consisted of Germans.[69] The tourist traffic is generally quite one sided. However, all the East Central European nations are represented in the tourist traffic in West Germany. Since 1961 Bulgaria has been opened up to West German tourist traffic, and many West Germans travel to resort towns, such as Varna, to meet relatives, notably from East Germany since this appears to be the easiest way to effect a family reunion.[70]

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[67] A.K. Dziewanowski, "West Germany and East Europe," Current History, vol. 44, no. 260 (April, 1963), p. 213.

[68] "Poland and Germany: The Beitz Collection," The Economist, vol. 206, no. 6227 (January 12, 1963), p. 100.

[69] Dziewanowski, loc. cit.

[70] Kastl Interview of July 15, 1963.

In the religious field one might expect the Catholic faith to be a bond between East Europe, particularly Poland, and West Germany with a large percentage of its population and its Chancellor belonging to the Catholic faith. However, disputes have arisen involving the Holy See who attempts to pursue a "neutral" course while trying to minister to Catholics living in the disputed provinces east of the Oder-Neisse rivers. A pre-World War II concordat between the Vatican and the German Reich provided for German approval of all appointments of Catholic clergy. In 1953 the Polish government issued a similar decree for Poland, including former German territories. When Cardinal Wyszynski, the Polish Primate, was released in 1956 from jail he eventually succeeded in placing Polish bishops in the disputed territories which led to West Germany initiating representations at the Vatican, although fruitless. All statements made by the Pope are, of course, scrutinized in order to determine whether he appears to recognize the finality of the Oder-Neisse border or not.

If statements are studied it seems that to a large degree they favor the present Polish boundary. The memorandum of the eight protestant leaders, discussed earlier, bears this out and Catholic clergy as well favor this border in their statements.[71]

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[71]Note, for example, The Times (London), October 17, 1960, p. 10.

However, the Roman Catholic clergy is considered more likely to lend itself to conciliatory efforts between West Germany and East Central Europe,[72] and there are contacts between them across the iron curtain.

In January, 1960, Chancellor Adenauer visited the Pope and stated in connection with this visit that the German people had a divine mission in stemming the expanion of evil from the east and act as a guardian of the West.[73] However, memories of World War II have not yet subsided sufficiently into the past, and comments of "pious arrogance" ensued.[74]

The Advent of the sixties: foreign trade with political overtones. As the sixties arrived Adenauer continued for some time to think primarily of Poland, as far as East Europe is concerned. It should be recalled that an abortive summit conference took place in May of 1960 during which the question of Berlin and Germany was to be aired. This, of course, colored German thinking for some time. During the month of July the Polish government became upset over statements made by Adenauer before refugee groups and sent another round of notes requesting clarification on border issues to the NATO governments. Again in August Economics

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[72] Freund, op. cit., p. 99.

[73] Arnaldo Cortesi, "Adenauer Sees a Divine Mission," The New York Times, January 23, 1960, p. 5.

[74] The New York Times, January 30, 1960, p. 5.

Minister Erhart reiterated much of Adenauer's earlier speeches, namely that the German expelless have the Heimatrecht, but that the Germans desire to live as peaceful neighbors with the Poles.[75] However, at about the time Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz delivered a major speech against Adenauer, in the summer of 1960, he met Herr Berthold Beitz, the manager of the Krupp Industries, at a trade fair in Poznan.

Berthold Beitz, the son of a bank teller, who became the president of a Hamburg insurance company, joined the Krupp complex in 1952 and became its general manager. This was the first time a non-Ruhr man entered the top echelons of the Krupp management. However, he was purposely selected and has become an efficient manager of the many phased industries Krupp participates in. Mr. Beitz is a direct antithesis of his superior, Herr Krupp. The former plays the drums, likes jazz and the modern conveniences of life - he owns a Hollywood-style home complete with a heated swimming pool -, while Herr Krupp, a Bach fan, is described as an individual who is serious to the point of being dour.[76]

During World War II Beitz served as an administrator of the Galician oilfields in Poland from the autumn of 1939 until

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[75] von Siegler, op. cit., Hauptband II, pp. 453-467, passim; and The New York Times, August 29, 1960.

[76] The New York Times, December 7, 1960, p. 24.

March 1944. There he gained the reputation among the Poles as a person who tried to alleviate the rigors of occupation and is credited with saving many lives.[77] Since becoming general manager he has traveled extensively in Eastern Europe under the premise that ideology does not have anything to do with business, but business is business and the company to do business with is Krupp.[78] With his easy going manner he has gained the confidence of many East Europeans notably in Poland because of his war experience and his ability to speak Polish.

It is believed that Beitz received an invitation from Cyrankiewicz to visit Poland during the above-mentioned fair. However, in November 1960 he received a formal invitation and in December he spent a week in Poland with Adenauer's encouragement.[79]

On January 10, 1961, Chancellor Adenauer revealed in a speech that while in Warsaw Beitz had recommended that a permanent German trade mission be established and trade between the two nations increased. Adenauer stressed that Beitz had conducted himself in a most "unexceptionable fashion." All in all,

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[77]"Germany's Polish Problem," The Economist, vol. 198 (February 11, 1961), p. 573.

[78]Arthur J. Olsen, "Krupp's Manager Visits Warsaw," The New York Times, December 7, 1960, p. 24.

[79]Ibid.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

Adenauer hoped that closer relations with Poland could be attained.[80]

This speech generated much speculation as to how far the Chancellor was willing to go to foster these closer relations. The State Secretary of the Federal Press Office saw fit to emphasize the following day that too much meaning was read into the Chanellor's speech and nothing as specific as a trade mission was discussed as yet, but in any event, no territorial issues would be compromised.[81] On January 19, 1961, a Foreign Office official told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag that no diplomatic relations were contemplated, and two days later Secretary Gomułka stated that any rapprochement between West Germany and Poland would depend on West German admission that the Oder-Neisserivers would be the final border.[82]

The day after Gomułka's statement, January 22, Seitz appeared in Warsaw in his private plane, stayed thirty hours and then flew back to West Germany. While in Warsaw he stated that to improve Polish-German relations attempts should first be made in the economic and cultural field, for example, by the conclusion of a long term trade agreement. Any diplomatic relations

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[80] The Times, (London), January 11, 1961, p. 8.

[81] The Times (London), January 12, 1961, p. 9.

[82] von Siegler, op. cit., Hauptband II, p. 542.

were, for the time being, outside the realm of reality.[83] After his return official pronouncements in Bonn stated that he had gone to Warsaw with governmental approval as an ambassador of good will, but that hereinafter discussions on this subject were to be conducted through official channels.[84]

The next day, January 25, the Bonn government officially stated that West German-Polish negotiations were to begin in about a month without comment as to agenda or location,[85] while the Poles were reputedly hopeful that a three year trade agreement could be negotiated.[86]

The talks were reportedly held in Paris where the Germans proposed exchange of trade missions empowered to discharge consular duties while the Poles insisted on full diplomatic relations with recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier, something the Bonn government did not accept although some of the Social Democratic opposition did.[87]

About a year later Berthold Beitz offered a post-mortem of these events in the Hamburg newspaper, Die Zeit. He stated that the Poles desired a long term trade agreement, an agreement to erect

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[83] The Times (London), January 24, 1961, p. 8.

[84] von Siegler, op. cit., Hauptband II, p. 543; The Times (London), January 25, 1961, p. 32; The New York Times, January 25, 1961, p. 3.

[85] The New York Times, January 26, 1961, p. 3.

[86] The New York Times, January 27, 1961, p. 4.

[87] Sidney Gruson, "Warsaw at Odds with Bonn on Tie, "The New York Times, February 23, 1961, p. 11.

a cultural center in Warsaw and, in general, the Poles wished to explore the possibility of future diplomatic relations. This latter issue prompted the West German Foreign Ministry to issue statements against diplomatic recognition; Beitz returned to Warsaw hoping to smooth over matters. The Ambassadors of the two nations met in Copenhagen, but by then the Poles had increased their demands and the atmosphere had deteriorated. Herr Beitz blamed, to some degree, the West German Foreign Office for not accepting Polish offers before they were raised, but speculated that election year pressure and obstinate adherence to the Hallstein Doctrine exerted undue influence.[88]

It is generally believed that too much publicity and too high expectations ruined the hopes of achieving any success in these negotiations.[89]

At the end of March, 1961, the fourth meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact took place and a short communiqué was issued belaboring a German peace treaty and a Berlin settlement in particular.[90] In Warsaw diplomatic observers opined that the communiqué was intended to induce the west to apply pressure on West Germany to come to

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[88] Editorial in The Times (London), April 12, 1962, p. 15.

[89] Kastl Interview of March 11, 1963.

[90] "Warsaw Pact: No Fire Works in Moscow," "The Economist, vol. 199, no. 6137 (April 8, 1961), p. 117.

a national market in recent yet, is growing, the Texas market to maintain the quantity of Texas domestic products. This latter issue prompted the Texas Tourist Council to issue advertents against tourists, encouraging their consumed in Texas supply to spend their money. The consumers of the Texas market are in competition, not by lack the Texas and the crowded trail should not the consumers and businessmen. Here Texas likewise, in some respect, the Texas Tourist Council for the sub commission (which other states have been taken, and specialized that attention from consumers and statistics advertents to the National Tourist provide other information.[58]

It is probable [illegible] that the most reliability and the high reputations values the point of [illegible] and supplied in these particulars.[59]

At the end of [illegible], the Texas Department of the Tourist Promotion Division of the Texas that look place and a short [illegible] and [illegible] a Texas image survey and a [illegible] [illegible].[60] To improve the tourist [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] was [illegible] to induce the most to apply pressure [illegible] to make to

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[58]Advertent of The Texas Tourist [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[59]Texas Discovery [illegible] [illegible].

[60]Texas [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] "The [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

terms with its communist neighbors.[91] To further emphasize the point on March 30, 1961, a senior member of Polish communist party's Politburo assailed West Germany for failing to heed Berthold Beitz's suggestions and said:

> This rowdy policy of Bonn is becoming irritating for certain circles in the West, which are striving to reach agreement with our camp and which consider our Oder-Neisse frontier to be a historically irrevocable fact, although they do not want to recognize it formally.[92]

In May of 1961 a report was published by a multi-party committee of the Bundestag. This committee had worked for several years on a re-evaluation of West German Ostpolitik. It recommended the goal of a free and united Germany having friendly relations with all of Eastern Europe and urged the Federal Government to normalize relations with this area without forfeiting vital German interests; to promote cultural and human relations with this area keeping the psychological impediments of German-Polish relationships in mind; to undertake within the governmental structure such institutional measures that would ensure that eastern problems be accorded the attention their significance requires; and that the Federal Republic must be in a position to take appropriate political action in regard to the people of Eastern Europe, should the opportunity be favorable.[93] This recommendation was unanimously adopted by the

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[91] Arthur J. Olsen, "Bonn Held Target of Red Bloc Drive," The New York Times, April 1, 1961, p. 3.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Jaksch, op. cit., p. 35.

Bundestag on June 14, 1961.[94]

This was one of the last acts of the third Bundestag. Elections took place during the summer and a new Bundestag and new cabinet reconvened in the fall, a subject for the next chapter. To color the election campaign the communists erected the Berlin wall in August 1961. However, before leaving this time period an overview of West Germany's greatest inroads into Eastern Europe should be analysed, namely commercial relations.

Commercial Relations Between West Germany and Eastern Europe

Trade agreements have made up the bulk of satisfactory relations between East Central Europe and West Germany, although the German government's feeling lately seems to be that the Germans do this trading because it is politically desirable although economically not mandatory.[95] The annual trade agreements have not been concluded perfunctorily as evidenced by the numerous short-term extensions. As described in the case of Rumania, a trade agreement can be used as a lever to attain other ends. However, a three year trade agreement was concluded between the Soviet Union and West Germany in January 1961.[96] Of course, the two nations have diplomatic relations which facilitated the conclusion thereof.

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[94] Ibid.

[95] Kastl Interview of March 11, 1963.

[96] The New York Times, January 1, 1961, p. 4.

[illegible] on [illegible] [illegible].[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

Figures 1 - 7 give a survey of the trade between West Germany and East Central Europe since 1950. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, some statistics of trade with the USSR have been included for the sake of unity and comparison.

Before examining these statistics a resumé of trade with Albania will be given inasmuch as trade with this nation has been so negligeable that graphic presentation is not feasible. Since 1953 West Germany has imported a yearly total of goods ranging from $25,000 to $125,000 reaching this peak in 1959.[97] In turn exports from West Germany have fluctuated between $25,000 to $250,000 a year. These transactions comprise less than .01% of West Germany's foreign trade. West German exports are primarily composed of pharmaceuticals and building fixtures.

In Figures 1 - 7 the general impression is of a gradual increase in trade in both directions as far as the satellites are

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[97] To compile these and succeeding statistics information has been extracted passim from the following sources:

1. German Federal Republic, Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschlands (Wiesbaden: W. Kohlhammer GmbH, volumes for 1956, 1959 and 1962). Trade statistics are shown in D-Marks which have conveniently been recomputed at four to a dollar. All percentages quoted for German imports and exports and all West German trade values shown in Figures 1-7 are those given in this source.

2. United Nations, Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Bulletin for Europe, 1961-1962. Note: although these figures appear in a United Nations publication, they originate from communist sources, which thus makes their credibility debatable.

3. Yugoslavia, Federativna narodna republika Jugoslavija [Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia], Savezni zavod za statistiku [Federal Statistical Institute], Statistički godišnjak FNRJ [Statistical Yearbook of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia] (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku, volumes for 1961 and 1962).



FIGURE 1

WEST GERMAN TRADE WITH BULGARIA

NOTE: The unbroken line represents the percentage of West German exports destined for Bulgaria; similarly the broken line represents imports. Solid columns represent West German exports to Bulgaria in millions of dollars; open columns indicate imports.



FIGURE 2

WEST GERMAN TRADE WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA

NOTE: The unbroken line represents the percentage of West German exports destined for Czechoslovakia; similarly the broken line represents imports. Solid columns represent West German exports to Czechoslovakia in millions of dollars; open columns indicate imports.



FIGURE 5

WEST GERMAN TRADE WITH HUNGARY

NOTE: The unbroken line represents the percentage of West German exports destined for Hungary; similarly the broken line represents imports. Solid columns represent West German exports to Hungary in millions of dollars; open columns indicate imports.



FIGURE 4

WEST GERMAN TRADE WITH POLAND

NOTE: The unbroken line represents the percentage of West German exports destined for Poland; similarly the broken line represents imports. Solid columns represent West German exports to Poland in millions of dollars; open columns indicate imports.



FIGURE

WEST GERMAN TRADE WITH RUMANIA

NOTE: The umbrella [illegible] represents the percentage [illegible] German exports destined for Rumania; similarly the [illegible] represent imports. Solid columns represent West German exports to Rumania in millions of [illegible]; open columns indicate imports.



FIGURE 6

WEST GERMAN TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

NOTE: The unbroken line represents the percentage of West German exports destined for the Soviet Union; similarly the broken line represents imports. Solid columns represent West German exports to the Soviet Union in millions of dollars; open columns indicate imports.



FIGURE 6

WEST GERMAN TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

NOTE: The unbroken line represents the percentage of West German exports destined for the Soviet Union; similarly the broken line represents imports. Solid columns represent West German exports to the Soviet Union in millions of dollars; open columns indicate imports.



FIGURE 7

WEST GERMAN TRADE WITH YUGOSLAVIA

NOTE: The unbroken line represents the percentage of West German exports destined for Yugoslavia; similarly the broken line represents imports. Solid columns represent West German exports to Yugoslavia in millions of dollars; open columns indicate imports.

concerned. While examining these it must be remembered that the volume of West German foreign trade has increased drastically during the fifties with the value of exports surging far ahead of imports since 1953, giving West Germany a very favorable trade balance. In 1950 German imports were valued at about $2.0 billion, in 1961 $11 billion; in 1950 German exports slightly exceeded $2 billion, in 1961 $12.7 billion.

In 1955 a marked increase in German trade with Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia took place, while in the case of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria yearly volumes did not vary too much, but some gradual increases are discernable. The trade embargo imposed on Rumania in 1959 is noticeable in Figure 5. Especially since the advent of the sixties German exports have exceeded imports in value with the striking exception of Poland which is gaining valuable Western currency in its trade with West Germany. Bulgaria and Albania are the most insignificant trading partners, while trade with the USSR has expanded rapidly. The percentages of satellite trade with West Germany are small and seemingly insignificant, but since West Germany exports goods and materials needed for expanding the various national industries these figures become more significant.

The situation with Yugoslavia is most striking. Her own statistics show her high dependence on West Germany and Figure 7 shows that continuously West Germany has exported far more to this country than she has imported; in fact in the sixties the export

values are more than double the import values, giving an impression that Yugoslavia is on the West German dole. In the post-war period Yugoslavia has had a very unfavorable balance of trade. In the fifties Yugoslavia was West Germany's largest East European trading partner except for Poland in 1956. Since 1960 the USSR has replaced Yugoslavia in this respect.

In surveying commodities traded, West Germany exports to all these countries mainly iron and steel, chemicals and a diverse number of items collectively called machinery. In turn, West Germany imports the following main commodities from:

1. Bulgaria: produce, dairy products and tobacco;
2. Czechoslovakia: coal, textiles, glass, dairy products and produce;
3. Hungary: meat, produce and some petroleum;
4. Poland: coal, meat and produce, basic chemicals and lumber;
5. The USSR: petroleum, raw materials, hides, lumber and grain; and
6. Yugoslavia: bauxite and hops.

Summary

Apart from a steady expansion of trade with East Central Europe from 1956 to 1961, West Germany has had a generally frustrating experience trying to come to terms with its eastern neighbors. The 1956 uprisings in Eastern Europe presented new opportunities which the Germans would have liked to exploit, and had not Tito's recognition of East Germany taken place a year later, West German relations with the satellites may have improved. Yugoslav recognition of East Germany had a very discouraging

effect upon West Germany. The communist propaganda barrage and the East German and Berlin issues on the one side, and West German doctrines such as the Hallstein Doctrine and the Heimatsrecht Doctrine on the other, succeeded in keeping the iron curtain intact. In foreign ministers' meetings the West Germans were reluctant to depart from previously stated positions.

Aside from official matters some success has been achieved in addition to trade relations in repatriation of separated family members through Red Cross arrangements. Towards the end of the period, increased cultural relationships occurred, evidencing popular interest in Eastern Europe.

CHAPTER VII

WEST GERMAN RELATIONS WITH EAST CENTRAL EUROPE SINCE OCTOBER 1961

On September 17, 1961 was the election of the fourth West German Bundestag which opened one month later, while Adenauer's new cabinet did not emerge until the following month. In the election results the most noteworthy fact is that for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic more Social Democratic votes were cast than Christian Democratic, which was reflected in the composition of the Bundestag. Adenauer had sufficient support from other parties to form a coalition government. The composition of his cabinet changed to some extent, notably, for the purposes of this thesis, in that Schroeder succeeded von Brentano as foreign minister. Before this Schroeder was Minister of the Interior; upon his appointment von Brentano became chairman of the Commission of the European Economic Community in Brussels.

Search for New Solutions

At the end of October during the transition from one cabinet to another it was reported that the West German government was studying the possibility of resurrecting the 1959 plans for non-aggression pacts. At the end of the session of the third Bundestag, it will be recalled from the previous chapter that the Federal

government was urged to adopt a more positive and active outlook toward its eastern neighbors. Furthermore, a new administration governed in Washington and considerable discussion on this subject must have passed between Bonn and Washington.

Adenauer's concern over concluding non-aggression pacts resulted from the belief that this might limit diplomatic maneuverability in the discussion of territorial issues and might be a step toward future diplomatic recognition. On many occasions the West German government had stated unilaterally that force was not to be used in solving the eastern problems. However, if instead of concluding a formal non-aggression pact, simultaneous publication of declarations of non-aggression by West Germany and the satellite governments could be arranged through third parties, one could circumvent the above-mentioned objections to direct negotiation. Furthermore these declarations could be deposited with the United Nations for added emphasis. This plan reportedly originated from Ambassador Grewe with the support of Chancellor Adenauer.[1]

Any such declarations have not as yet been forthcoming. However, in the realm of private agreement the West Germans took a step that hitherto had not been contemplated. In November 1961 the International Red Cross, acting for the German Red Cross, arranged with the Polish Red Cross for monetary compensation to Polish women who had been victimized by Nazi medical experiments

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[1]David Binder, "Bonn May Offer Reds a Peace Vow," The New York Times, October 29, 1961, p. 1; and The Times (London) October 30, 1961, p. 8.

during World War II. Seventy-three Polish women were allowed compensations ranging from $6,250 - $10,000.[2]

On the official side, one of the new Foreign Minister's first undertakings was to set up a new staff to re-evaluate West Germany's Ostpolitik. His pragmatic approach served as a guide to this new staff composed of East European experts, and Chancellor Adenauer predicted a more active Ostpolitik in a New Year's speech.[3]

In May of 1962 it is reported that Berthold Beitz, the unofficial roving West German good will ambassador to East Central Europe, extended some feelers to Hungary and Rumania which led to ambassadorial talks in third countries.[4] In June and October Dr. Schroeder delivered major foreign policy speeches quoted above[5] calling for closer contacts with Eastern Europe in spite of satellite resistance.

During the summer and early fall West Germany and Hungary were reported to be quietly negotiating closer trade relations. The Hungarians, as well as other agricultural satellite nations, were concerned over the growing tariff barriers erected around agricultural imports into the Common Market nations. Since West

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[2] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1961-1962, p. 18432.

[3] Alleman, op. cit., p. 32; and Dziewanowski, op. cit., p. 209.

[4] The Times (London), September 29, 1962, p. 7.

[5] Vide supra, Ch. IV, pp. 37-38.

Germany follows Great Britain as leading food importer this is a serious subject for the Germans as well.[6] However, the talks broke down over trade missions. The Hungarians wanted to have their trade missions in West Germany to enjoy consular privileges, but this would have been too liberal an interpretation of the Hallstein Doctrine as far as the West Germans were concerned. But both parties departed leaving the door ajar.[7]

During these negotiations a younger member, quite influential in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag and with the Latin-sounding name of Majonica, had urged Dr. Schroeder in an article to improve relations with East Central Europe by establishing trade missions in these satellite nations which already had trade representatives in West Germany.[8] As it turned out Majonica's wishes were fulfilled to some extent.

A West German-East Central European Agreement

Although the Hungarian talks were not successful Schroeder was not rebuffed. In his October, 1962, speech he hinted at closer commercial relationships:

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[6]Sarah Gainham, "Drang nach Osten?", The Spectator, vol. 209, no. 7007 (October 12, 1962), p. 545.

[7]The Times (London), September 29, 1962, p. 7.

[8]Ibid.; and Gainham, loc. cit.

> We are examining the possibility of establishing commercial representations in Eastern Europe; for the time being this has only limited objectives. We are considering first steps along the way to a better relationship between ourselves and East European States.[9]

In January 1961 the Poles had sought to gain a long-term agreement, timing their request to the Beitz trips and just following the conclusion of the three-year Soviet-West German trade agreement. In May 1961 the West Germans expressed their willingness to do so, but apparently these efforts did not materialize.[10] Shortly after Schroeder's October speech, negotiations were quietly started on November 29, 1962 with the Poles and they lasted until March 1963.

The negotiations produced a three-year trade agreement on March 7, 1963, which was somewhat expected, but in addition, the two nations agreed to the establishment of a West German trade mission in Warsaw which would administer the agreement. The West German government stressed the fact that this was a concrete result of the Bundestag's May 1961 proposal and that it was willing to enter into similar agreements with other East European nations, notably Hungary.[11] However, the Chancellor pointed out that this agreement with the Poles in no way touched upon the Oder-Neisse frontier problem.[12]

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[9]Schroeder, Peace, Freedom, Order, p. 16.

[10]The Times (London), May 14, 1961, p. 3.

[11]Informationsfunk der Bundersregierung, Bonn, den 8, März, 1963, Sendung für Nordamerika.

[12]Ibid.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

In examining the provisions of this agreement it appears that Polish exports to West Germany totaling $116 million annually and showing an increase of about one-third of previous yearly amounts will exceed West German exports to Poland, amounting to $97.5 million annually, by some fifteen percent, which will give Poland a very favorable balance of trade and a supply of western currency.[13]

Regarding commodities to be traded some detailed provisions enumerate as German exports a wider variety of finished goods, chemical and pharmaceutical products, non-ferrous metals, fire resistant products, agrarian commodities, such as breeding cattle, forestry and fishing products, to the items listed in the previous chapter. In addition to earlier mentioned items the Poles will export rolling mill, heavy and light industrial products and various raw materials. At about the time the trade negotiations were going on, the Krupp industries were erecting a large petroleum-based synthetic fiber plant in Pinsk in the USSR, and it is expected that similar plants may be constructed in the Polish chemical center of Plock where a forty-inch pipeline from the Volga terminates.[14]

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[13]"New Trade Accord: A Step Towards Better Relations with Poland", The Bulletin, vol. 11, no. 10 (March 12, 1963), p. 1. Unless otherwise footnoted, this article is the chief source of treaty provisions.

[14]Paul Wohl, "West Germans, Poles Blaze Path," The Christian Science Monitor, March 12, 1963, p. 5.

In addition the provisions of this agreement to remove [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The trade agreement also provided for ocean transportation of the goods to be traded, which will circumvent the land route through East Germany. In addition, the head of the Polish trade mission in Frankfurt and the head of the German mission in Warsaw will jointly form a mixed commission to aid in the execution of this agreement. The German mission will be composed of senior officials, but without full diplomatic privileges.

Shortly after the conclusion of this agreement, Dr. Schroeder stated in an interview that he attached political value to it inasmuch as it improved relations with Poland. He added that the Germans "have gone to great effort in accomplishing this agreement" and that the negotiations were characterized by "open-mindedness and sincerity,"[15] all of which points to considerable bargaining on both sides. The Foreign Minister emphasized that these improved economic foundations could lead to other steps such as better cultural and human contacts. Finally he warned that conjecture about future developments should not be based on this agreement.[16]

In concluding this agreement West Germany helped Poland scale the agricultural tariff wall surrounding the six Common

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[15]"New Trade Accord: A Step Towards Better Relations with Poland," op. cit., p. 2.

[16]Ibid.

Market nations and gave her a favorable trade balance.[17] The West German government also felt, unofficially, that this agreement has a tendency to isolate East Germany, since the West Germans are buying up Polish goods which otherwise could have been sold to the East Germans.[18]

The most difficult issue in the trade negotiations appeared to be the German insistence on some limited diplomatic immunities for the members of the trade mission in Warsaw. The problem was solved, according to diplomatic informants, by an unpublished protocol wherein the Poles agreed "on a de facto basis" to personal immunity and other limited privileges, something the Poles referred to as "backdoor diplomacy".[19]

The Poles also agreed informally to let a few Germans return to Polish territories for humanitarian reasons.[20] For the Polish population this agreement will constitute a step in their minds toward a reconciliation between West Germany and Poland.[21]

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[17]Editorial in The New York Times (Western Edition), March 15, 1963, p. 6.

[18]"Window To The East," Newsweek, vol. 61, no. 11 (March 18, 1963), p. 46.

[19]Arthur J. Olsen, "Poland to Admit Some Germans to Disputed Lands as Gesture," The New York Times (Western Edition), March 25, 1963, p. 2.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Korbonski Interview.

Since then there has been speculation in the press about similar agreements being negotiated, since the foot is now in the door, and it is logical to assume that further accords of this type will be concluded. To quote The Economist:

> . . . Herr Schröder is continuing quietly to prospect the possibilities of eventually reaching similar agreements with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania.[22]

Official comment on this statement is one of non denial with the added remark that Czechoslovakia and Rumania should reverse places in this statement.[23] In light of events this is a quite logical order. The Hungarian door was left ajar, as previously stated. In the current Soviet-Rumanian tiff over allocation of labor in the communist economic sphere, it would seem advantageous to the West Germans to take the initiative and extend their influence. Berthold Beitz must see profitable sales in these situations.

Evidencing hope for improving future relationships with East Central Europe, Foreign Minister Schroeder expressed himself in the following manner on June 28, 1963, in Duesseldorf:

> The agreements which we have recently concluded with the Polish government are, then, the first step in this direction. We were moved to this policy by the wish to re-establish official contacts with the states of Eastern Europe, to ease the atmosphere, to establish human and cultural relations and to further understanding for our mutual problems.

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[22]"Tale of a Tube," The Economist, vol. 206, no. 6240 (March 30, 1963), p. 1213.

[23]Kastl Interview of July 15, 1963.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

> We neither wish to isolate ourselves from the East European nations nor do they from us. Although the political dividends at present are low we still hope that in the course of time such contacts outside ideology may also be politically fruitful for both sides.[24]

The European Framework

So far the discussion of West German-East Central European relations has been contained within the narrow framework of the nations concerned. However, it is necessary to examine the effects of post-war European evolution more closely to determine its impact on the nations under discussion.

Brief mention has been made of Germany's participation in the many West European regional organizations and of the existence of the Warsaw Pact. The cold war with its resulting military organizations has been discussed in the chapter concerning impediments. As West Germany's influence in East Central Europe has been most far-reaching in the economic field it becomes necessary to note the influence of economic regional organizations.

West Germany's participation in the prospering Communities of the Six has been touched upon, but nothing has been said of the communist counterpart, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, abbreviated CEMA or COMECON. This organization was

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[24]Gerhard Schröder, "Points of Main Emphasis in German Foreign Policy," The Bulletin, Special Supplement dated July 9, 1963, p. 7.

created in 1949 as a countermove to the Marshall aid program, but it was not utilized effectively until the fifties after Stalin's death. In a way COMECON can be considered supra-national especially as far as the satellites are concerned in that the USSR as the senior member dominates the organization. Yugoslavia is not a member of COMA. However, its charter has formally included provisions for establishing and maintaining relations with other international organizations.[25]

In COMECON the USSR directed the satellites to a policy of "division of labor" by which each satellite is to specialize on what it can produce best for the benefit of all. However, communist economic management has left much to be desired and many economic problems have arisen. In its relations with the non-communist world, COMA has met a strong competitor in the EEC or the Common Market. From the communist idelogical point of view the free world refused most irritatingly to fall into economic decay, and Khrushchev has hurled much propaganda at the growing Common Market which in communist eyes has become an economic aggressor. In September, 1962, it appeared that Khruschev's thinking altered to subscribe to the slogan - if you can't lick them, join them - since he dropped hints that the USSR was going to evaluate its views

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[25]Article 11 as quoted in Ruth C. Lawson, International Regional Organizations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 220.

[illegible] to [illegible] as a [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

on "capitalist" economics.[26] Western Europe is the closest supplier of much advanced technological information that the Eastern bloc does not have and, in addition, western currency is always needed.[27] Nations have unsuccessfully tried to follow a policy of autarky; this can be equally difficult for an economic regional organization. The satellite trade with West Germany, or other free nations, comes under Kremlin scrutiny.

In the Rome Treaty of 1957 establishing the Common Market, provisions exist whereby in the transitional period two of the main institutions of the Community, the Commission and the Council, become more and more involved in harmonizing commercial policy with third countries.[28] Consequently, West Germany has had to coordinate its quotas in trade with a supranational organization.[29] After the expiration of the transitional period, presently planned for December 31, 1969,[30] the above institutions will conduct trade negotiations

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[26]The New York Times, September 2, 1962, p. 7.

[27]Harry Schwartz, "Soviet is Pressing Hard on Economics", "The New York Times, September 2, 1962, section IV, p. X3.

[28]European Communities' Publishing Service, Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community and Connected Documents (English translation; document 8012/5/A11/1961/5), articles 111-112, passim. Cited hereinafter as the Rome Treaty.

[29]Kastl Interview of March 11, 1963.

[30]European Community Information Service, The Facts (Brussels: ECI, September, 1962), p. 13.

with third countries.[31] The transitional period is divided into three four-year stages; the second stage came into being on January 1, 1962, to expire December 31, 1965, unless it is prolonged by the Council.[32] During this stage the Commission of the EEC has issued these instructions on trade between members and the communist bloc:

> Apart from multilateral trade with the Western World, there is also bilateral trade with the Eastern bloc countries. National quotas and liberalization lists for these countries will be replaced by quotas negotiated or fixed according to Community procedure. The liberalization lists drawn up autonomously by the various countries will be pooled and replaced by a Community list. The Commission will submit its initial proposals on this subject before the end of 1963.[33]

Thus, West Germany will become more and more dependent upon the decision of others in her non-EEC trade. This could lead to both adverse and favorable relations between West Germany and the satellite states, adverse if the two economic organizations insist on minimum relationships and high tariff walls, thereby forcing the satellites even more into the communist camp and widening the gap between themselves and West Germany; or favorable, if the two organizations can agree to some trade with one another. At present, for example, the EEC agricultural tariffs are exerting a detrimental effect on eastern trade and on trade with the free world as well.

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[31] Rome Treaty, article 113.

[32] European Community Information Service, loc. cit.

[33] European Economic Community Commission, Memorandum of the Commission on the Action Programme of the Community for the Second Stage (Brussels: Publishing Services of the European Communities, 8067-/5/XI/1962/5, 24 Oct. 1962), p. 78.

[illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

As seen in the previous chapter satellite trade with Western Europe is quite substantial. A few months before Khrushchev's second thoughts about the EEC Dr. Schroeder said the following about closer economic ties between the two blocs:

> The Common Market is not levelled against the Soviet Union or the other East bloc states..... The upward trend in our large market area will step up the demand for goods from other countries, including those belonging to the Eastern bloc, and be instrumental in increasing trade not only with the rest of the Free World, but also with East European countries. The progress made by the Common Market has already begun to have a beneficial effect on East-West trading. The total turnover in trade between the EEC countries and East European states rose from 1958-1961 by approximately 67%.
>
> Even in our memorandum to the Soviet Government of 21st. February [1962], we pointed out that we could imagine a greater measure of co-operation between the great economic potential of the Common Market and the East bloc states which would be of considerable benefit to all concerned.[34]

The population in East Central Europe is well aware of the results of the Common Market. Particularly astounding is the growth of West Germany from utter ruin to wealth. This organization is exerting a powerful attraction and is a shining example of contradiction to the communists who claim that their economic system is superior. Of course, any increase in EEC trade that the satellites would like to engage in is subject to COMECON approval.[35]

At present both officials of the Common Market and businessmen in its area are realizing the possibilities of trade with

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[34]Schroeder, Germany, Europe, and the Free World, pp. 7-8, passim.

[35]Visuiano, Lettrich and Korbonski Interviews.

As seen in the previous chapter, activities begun with Western Europe is quite substantial. A few months before Ismailov's second visit to the GDR in [illegible], Honecker said the following about East German economic ties between the two states:

> The German Democratic Republic is not interested in joining the Common Market or the other East bloc states.... The general trend is not there anyway and will stay on the domestic for years from economics, including those belonging to the Eastern bloc, and be instrumental in lessening tension and easing the work of the Free World, but also with their European neighbors. The progressive basis of the German Democratic Republic begins to have a beneficial effect on East-West relations. The Soviet Government in trade between the GDR demonstrates its true European nature from [illegible] to [illegible].
>
> Even in our economics to the Soviet Government of [illegible] Ministers [illegible], we endeavor not that we build towards a greater economy of co-operation between the great economic potentials of the German Democratic and the Soviet Union which would be of considerable benefit to all concerned.[24]

The population in East Central Europe is well aware of the results of the German Market. Particularly astonishing is the growth of West German trade with Eastern Europe. This organization is exerting a powerful attraction and is a strong example of contradiction to the economics and ideologies which Soviet economic systems is another. Of course, any increase in GDR trade that the establishment would like to engage in is subject to [illegible] approval.[25]

As pressure with activists of the Common Market and nationalism can in the area are realizing the possibilities of trade with

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[24]Honecker, Germany, Europe and the Cold World, pp. [illegible], passim.

[25]Fischer, Politics and Economics, [illegible].

eastern Europe.[36] In January, 1963, after Great Britain's application for Common Market membership had been turned down, de Gaulle concluded a three-year trade agreement with the USSR, and the Benelux countries reached a similar agreement with Hungary.[37] Thus, a number of long term trade agreements with the bloc nations is an established fact, initiating a new trend. Regarding future developments any prognostications will enter the area of conjecture. An authority on Eastern Europe has expressed himself in the following manner as he projects present trends into the future:

> The Common Market can be a powerful vehicle for attracting Europe and eventually Russia, but in the short run there is danger that it will actually intensify the political and economic integration of the Soviet pact of the Communist world. By making trade with the West more difficult, it has already forced some of the East European states into greater economic dependence on the Soviet Union. It is for this reason important to consider ways in which an economically united and increasingly powerful Europe could eventually extend the hand of cooperation to the States united in CEMA. A new European-based version of the Marshall Plan could be envisaged as a step toward the unification of all of Europe. Thus Eastern Europe as a unit, now more industrialized and increasingly integrated in CEMA, could be encouraged to relate itself step by step to an all-European economic development, at first in very loose form, later in a more binding fashion.[38]

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[36] Editorial in The New York Times (Western Edition), March 15, 1963, p. 6; and "Business Around the World," U.S. News and World Report, vol. 54, no. 25 (June 24, 1963), pp. 101-102.

[37] Professor Jan Hubert Wszelaki, lecture March 25, 1963 in Seminar on Eastern Europe, Course 33.789, American University, Washington, D.C.

[38] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "Threat and Opportunity in the Communist Schism," Foreign Affairs, vol. 41, no. 3 (April, 1963), pp. 521-522.

[illegible] Kennedy, 1960, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Summary

Since the assumption of office of the fourth West German cabinet efforts to establish closer relations with the East Central European nations have met with more success than previously. The conclusion of the three-year trade agreement with Poland has given West Germany a stronger foothold in East Central Europe with the chance of similar future agreements with other nations of this area. Concomitantly, West German participation in Western European regional organizations and the growth of this regionalism have contributed toward showing to East Europeans the fruits West Germany has gained from membership therein.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

From the presentation in the previous chapters the trends of contemporary West German relations with East Central Europe become quite evident.

West Germany has found it most difficult to develop a political outlook toward the East acceptable to all Germans. The West German government has seen fit to develop the Hallstein Doctrine as a measure to prevent or at least minimize universal acceptance of two Germanies, the Soviet Union being the only nation to do so de jure at present. Thus, diplomatic relations will not be established with East Central European nations without modifications to this doctrine. There is in Germany considerable opposition to it and many think it should be discarded. To this is added the Heimatsrecht Doctrine wherein the refugee groups' interests are recognized, but which has a disquieting effect on West Germany's nearest eastern neighbors.

With this in mind West German foreign policy towards Osteuropa becomes subject to so much restriction that at times it almost approaches the vanishing point. As has been shown, the West Germans' stated foreign policy in East Europe has been to promote friendly and neighborly relations. Before gaining full sovereignty there was no activity in this field except with Yugoslavia. Diplomatic

CONCLUSION

Thus the premeditation in this particular situation has brought of unfortunately that Cuban relations and also Soviet. These two-area quite evident.

Mark Kennedy has found it very difficult to develop a political outlook based the that acceptable to all Canadians. The Mark Cuban government has been its to develop the Canadian Textiles as a country to support in it trade normalize relations. acceptance of the Canadians, the United States feels the only thing to do is to [illegible] it alone. Thus, diplomatic solutions will not be satisfactory with Mark Canada Cuban relations without unfavorable to this country. There is in Canada considerable opposition to it but only time is needed to be discussed. In this is added the [illegible] Canadian economic in relations because United are prevailing, has which has a significant effect on that Canada's Cuban western neighbors.

This this is also that Cuban foreign policy towards [illegible] become subject to so much publicity that it tend to almost exploitation the relationship with. As has been shown, the that Canadian Cuban foreign policy is not having the best to promote friendly and neighborly relations. Future Canadian will accordingly have no ability to take force action with Canada. Diplomatic

relations were established in the early fifties while Tito was persona non grata in the communist camp. The uprisings in Western Europe in the autumn of 1956 left their impressions on the Germans as on the rest of the world, and the West German government began slowly to reconsider its position vis-à-vis Poland in particular. However, when Tito recognized East Germany in the fall of 1957, the West German government apparently realized it was futile to deal with communist governments and, thus, refrained from any overtures for some time. Under Western prodding, non-aggression pacts with satellite nations were considered, but finally rejected by the Germans. Feelers such as the 1959 anniversary speech by Adenauer and the Seitz missions in early 1961 also came to naught. With a new administration and a new foreign minister responding to increased Social and Free Democratic representation in the Bundestag, an element of more flexibility was introduced into West Germany's Ostpolitik, which has evidenced itself by the establishment of a permanent West German trade mission in Warsaw, and the conclusion of a three-year trade agreement in March of 1963. It will be recalled that Berthold Seitz attempted to achieve this in his 1960/1961 journeys to Warsaw.

In order to present the other side of the picture, the satellites have expressed their willingness to open diplomatic relations with West Germany. Since they all recognize East Germany and in addition, Poland has insisted on West German acquiescence on the Oder-Neisse frontier, this is not within the framework of reality.

however, the satellites as well as their control center, the Soviet Union, have almost continually maintained a propaganda barrage concerning resurging German militarism, the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the East German régime, and the Berlin situation, all of which exert deterrent effects.

The critique of West German Ostpolitik has been varied. Mieroszewski stated that there had been none[1] in support of which an argument can be raised if one evaluates only in terms of concrete achievements. Gerald Freund maintains that West Germany's Ostpolitik should be one of minimizing the fear of Germany and Germans, especially in Poland, and to this end the Oder-Neisse line should be recognized and the Hallstein Doctrine abolished.[2] Concerning West German governmental response to similar pressures, notably from the political opposition, a German writer observed that "a painful process of reorientation from below.... is going on under the deceptive cover of official lethargy."[3]

With all the obstacles present any West German effort to change its image among the eastern population must indeed be monumental. From observation of past endeavours it seems that the Adenauer-von Bretano team for guiding Ostpolitik has been more doctrinaire than the Adenauer-Schroeder combination, since in the

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[1]Vide supra, Chapter IV, p. 49.

[2]Freund, op. cit., p. 253.

[3]Alleman, op. cit., p. 36.

latter instance a more pragmatic approach has been undertaken and more flexibility has been introduced. The Adenauer anniversary speech of 1959 is a case in point. Adenauer made a number of conciliatory remarks, but was thoroughly rebuffed by the Polish communist government. Again in 1960 and 1961 feelers were extended in form of the Seitz visits, but if the West German government had been less cautious and had acted with more dispatch the present West German trade mission in Warsaw may have been two years old by now. The Polish Prime Minister's reaction to Adenauer's speech of August 31, 1959 was really quite predictable. He likened the speech to a wedge driven between Poland and the Soviet Union which could be the result, if Eastern Europeans were to trust such statements. Consequently, the communist hold over the population would be in some small measure loosened and in turn free world aims advanced. However, as will be discussed below this may be happening now, inasmuch as the population of East Europe is not entirely ignorant of West German achievements in Western Europe.

Since West Germany is a close neighbor of East Central Europe, and since West German interest in eastern affairs is keen and probably greater than in other Western European countries, and historically has been so, this nation is the logical one to extend the ideas of the West back into the "borderlands of Western Civilization." No doubt East Europeans would be willing to live in peace with West Germany if they could freely choose to do so, as long as they could be assured that this would not invite German hegemony. Thus, it

almost becomes necessary under present circumstances, for West Germany to force its good intentions upon the East Europeans, surmounting communist hindrances.

The West Germans have made the greatest inroads into East Europe through trade. During the fifties trade was developed through unofficial channels by the Ostausschuss, although the trade agreements themselves were signed by a cabinet minister, usually the Minister of Agriculture. Since the Germans export much precision machinery and equipment and iron and steel, the importance of German trade is considerable, since the loss of it would require the East Europeans to rely more heavily on what the Soviets are willing to offer in this field. As inferred earlier, the loss of this trade could hamper their national industries.

The advocates of the theory of functionalism as the vehicle for maintaining and furthering international peace and security can point to present economic relations between West Germany and East Central Europe as a possible basis for closer collaboration between East and West. Profitable business has an affinity for bridging gaps where politics cannot. Business spearheaded the first penetration of the iron curtain and politics slowly followed suit. The Ostausschuss, composed of business interests, exerts a strong lobby-type pressure on the West German government. In this connection it is interesting to observe the timing of two events, described above separately. Between the two Beitz visits to Warsaw in December 1960 and January 1961, the first three-year trade agreement concluded

by West Germany and a communist state took place; this event must have seemed auspicious to the satellites. However, trade alone did not put the pressure on politics. As appreciable amount of political force came from the Bundestag, as has been seen, where Social Democrats have led attempts to ameliorate relations with Eastern Europe. Wenzel Jaksch's report, cited above,[4] is one of the most important recommendations in this respect, and so acknowledged by the West German government. The composition of the fourth Bundestag also contributed in this respect, inasmuch as the Chancellor's party diminished in size therein.

To the free world this East-West trade will be beneficial inasmuch as West Germany contributes to a greater East European dependence upon the West. As West German trade increases more opportunities will develop for interrelations across the iron curtain.

Although not exemplified in concrete West German-East Central European relations, West German experiences in post-war Western Europe has affected the opinions and outlook of Eastern Europeans. About ten years ago Professor Seton-Watson, an expert on East European history, stated that West Germany had to associate herself with the West for national survival and that West Germans should realize that West European solidarity was necessary in the cold war.[5] This West Germany has done, and one German authority considers this

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[4]Vide supra, Ch. VI, p. 97.

[5]Hugh Seton-Watson, "Eastern Europe and the German Problem," The Twentieth Century, vol. 153 (March, 1953), pp. 200 and 202.

nation the most European-minded of the members of the Common Market.[6] As the remarks of the East European émigré leaders have pointed out[7] the development of West Germany since the end of the war serves as a concrete example of progress in the free world. On the other hand, the non-community trade of the Common Market can have detrimental effects should this organization enclose itself with economic barriers and become as colorfully expressed by an émigré leader "an economic ghetto".[8] Furthermore, President de Gaulle's view of a l'Europe des patries has put a brake on European integration and it is difficult to predict what the outcome is going to be, although it is likely that the unification drive will continue since this is supported by the majority. West German-East Central European relationships would suffer should European integration become retarded. To East Europeans, European integration has become attractive and a goal they would like to attain some day. Although the members of the Communities of the Six still call themselves sovereign nations large sectors of their sovereignty has been yielded to supranational organizations. Thus, especially those East Europeans who suffered most during World War II under Nazi Germany, should feel that present day West Germany is restricted in

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[6]Carl G. Anthon, "Germany and the European Community," Current History, vol. 38, no. 221 (January, 1961), p. 12.

[7]Vide supra, Ch. IV, p. 53.

[8]Korbonski Interview.

her maneuverability and cannot always act independently; this should alleviate much fear of a revival of any German imperialistic trends.

To refer back to Professor Brzezinski, his estimate on the future Eastern Europe is expressed in this manner:

> In promoting the evolution of Eastern Europe, an essential role will inevitably be played by Western Europe. As de Gaulle has unintentionally demonstrated, the concept of European unity is perhaps the most potent force on the Continent today, and it is gradually beginning to be felt in Russia also....
>
> Eastern Europe can serve as a transmission belt reaching even wider circles of Soviet society, especially the intelligentsia. And as China increasingly repels, it gradually pushes Russia toward Europe and sets the stage for perhaps an entirely new historical relationship.[9]

So far this bold statement has been essentially correct. The Chinese have seriously repelled the Russians and the Soviet Union has been pushed westward, rather than towards Europe, as the initialling of the recent test ban treaty has evidenced.

As concluding remarks the following observations can be summarized and deduced from the factual presentation and the discussion of events and issues in this thesis.

It is believed that West Germany has had an Ostpolitik. It has impediments, some self-imposed by German produced doctrines, others by the Cold War. It has expressed itself through economic relations which have increased steadily ever since the early fifties. Attempts at political adjustments have not taken place until recently although the desire for amelioration of relations is not new. Thus, business has preceeded politics.

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[9]Brzezinski, "Threat and Opportunity in the Communist Schism," pp. 521-522, passim.

Whatever political exploration West Germany has made up to now in East Central Europe, the thought that the international position of East Germany should not be enhanced thereby has always been paramount. Of equal importance has been the issue of not approving any finality of present eastern borders of Poland.

In its relations with East Central Europe West Germany has benefited indirectly from its successes in West European integration and its reconciliation with France, since this evolution has made great impressions upon the population at large in the East serving to create a new image of Germany although the communist propaganda barrier attempts to conceal this.

Time is in favor of the East Europeans. The Oder-Neisse frontier has been in existence for eighteen years and so has East Germany, all of which assumes an outlook of permanence. Although it is doubtful if the German population will ever reconcile themselves to two permanent Germanies, the present Oder-Neisse frontier is considered settled in the minds of many West Germans, as they urge their government to accept it also.

German public interest in eastern affairs and culture has begun to increase since the advent of the sixties and if travel restrictions are not tightened, an increase of contacts will inevitably take place.

If present evolutionary trends continue assisted by the passage of time, West Germany and East Central Europe should move progressively closer together.

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